Expected seasoned equity offerings : a study of the difference in abnormal return between expected and unexpected SEOs by Solberg, Øyvind Westgård & Ørstenvik, Maria Birkelund
 
 
Expected Seasoned Equity 
Offerings 
A study of the difference in abnormal return between expected- 
and unexpected SEOs 
Øyvind Westgård Solberg & Maria Birkelund Ørstenvik 
Supervisor: Thore Johnsen 
Master thesis in Financial Economics 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or 
results and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, Fall, 2015 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Abstract 
In this thesis, the focus is on expected seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) completed 
by firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange or the Oslo Axess in the period between 
January 2011 and August 2015. We test a prediction that firms expected to execute 
an SEO should experience a less profound stock price reaction on the 
announcement date, as the market should already have factored in these 
expectations.  
The scope of the analysis was to examine the stock price reaction for firms on both 
the expectation- and announcement date. The analysis was based on two 
selections, one where all SEOs were defined as expected, and another where all 
were defined as unexpected. Separating firms in this way made it possible to 
analyze the difference in stock price reaction for expected- and unexpected SEOs 
on announcement. The input necessary to make inferences about the stock price 
reactions was gained through an event study. Furthermore, we examined how 
various firm characteristics affected the abnormal return.  
The most interesting results obtained through our analysis was that firms expected 
to execute an SEO actually experienced a larger, not a smaller negative abnormal 
return on the announcement date in comparison with firms that unexpectedly 
executed an SEO. The explanation for our surprising result may be that the majority 
of firms in the group of “expected SEOs” were firms with liquidity constraints. 
Additionally, the same firms experienced a large negative abnormal return on the 
expectation date.  
From our cross-sectional analysis, we observed that large capitalized firms where 
the market expected the SEO experienced a less negative announcement effect 
compared to firms with unexpected SEOs. Furthermore, firms connected to a crisis 
issue experienced a higher negative abnormal return on both event dates relative to 
those connected to growth. This result was equivalent for both expected- and 
unexpected SEOs.  
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3. Introduction 
When firms are in need of external financing they can either issue debt or equity. 
The two most prominent reasons for why firms are in need of new capital are new 
investment opportunities and current liquidity constraints. Regardless the reason, 
the market will have a reaction to news related to raising new capital.  
In recent decades, numerous studies have investigated the announcement effect of 
seasoned equity offerings. Common to all of these studies are the observed 
negative abnormal return. However, the market may expect the equity issue prior to 
the announcement. Given the efficient market hypothesis, these expectations 
should then already be reflected in the stock price on announcement. In accordance 
with this, we predict that the announcement effect is less profound for the firms 
expected to complete an SEO in comparison with those unexpectedly issuing new 
equity. Through this paper, we are trying to put an answer to this question.  
Our hypotheses are as follows: 
H0: There will be no difference in the announcement effect of expected- and 
unexpected SEOs. 
H1: The announcement effect of expected SEOs are smaller than for unexpected 
SEOs.  
In our analysis, we examine the announcement effect for expected- and unexpected 
SEOs. In addition, we examine the abnormal return for expected SEOs around the 
date where we defined the SEOs to be expected by the market. Moreover, we will 
try to examine the underlying reasons behind the observed abnormal returns by 
controlling for various firm characteristics.  
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4. Fundamental finacial theories  
Capital structure form the basis for all firm’s financial decisions, and are 
consequently a powerful tool to explain the motivation behind various decisions. To 
provide a deeper understanding of factors affecting equity issues we will in this 
chapter go through different fundamental financial theories related to capital 
structure. 
4.1 Capital structure in perfect capital markets  
A perfect capital market is characterized by the following: 
 No taxes  
 All financial transactions are free of charge  
 No bankruptcy costs (there is no increased costs of financing with debt 
instead of equity)  
 Equivalence in borrowing costs for both firms and investors   
 Symmetry of market information (all market participants have excess to the 
same information) 
 No effect of debt on firm’s earnings before interest and taxes  
 
The most important insight regarding capital structure goes back to Modigliani and 
Miller (MM). In the article “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment” (1958), based on the assumption of a perfect capital market, MM 
argued that capital structure is irrelevant for the total value of the firm. Total firm 
value is the value of equity additional to the value of debt. However, since the cost 
of capital is different for different securities, it is logical to presume that debt is a 
cheaper and better source of capital than equity. MM defended this by uttering that 
with leverage the cost of equity would increase, and consequently offset the effect of 
leverage.  
From the latter insight, MM constructed two propositions:  
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MM Proposition I: States that the firm’s market value is independent of the firm’s 
capital structure. Accordingly, the total cash flow paid out is unaffected by the capital 
structure. 
MM Proposition II: Suggests that the firm’s weighted average cost of capital 
remains constant independent of their capital structure. In other words, the cost of 
equity will increase proportionally to the share of debt. This is due to the relationship 
between debt and risk. Increased debt are followed by increased risk, which in turn 
will increase the required cost of equity.   
 
where rE is the expected cost of equity, rD is the expected cost of debt, E is the 
share of equity, and D is the share of debt.   
4.2 Capital structur in imperfect markets  
If we assume that Miller and Modigliani’s’ proposition I and II do not hold and that 
capital structure do in fact matter, then this must stem from market imperfections. It 
is among other things stated that taxes and bankruptcy costs do significantly effect a 
firm’s stock price, and in additional papers, even MM includes both the effect of 
taxes and bankruptcy costs. As it is more reasonable to presume that imperfections 
exist in the real world, we are introducing theories trying to explain capital structure 
including such imperfections. 
4.2.1 The trade-off theory  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) recognized the tax benefits from interest payments 
through the introduction of the trade-off theory. According to Kraus and 
Litzenberger, firms have to balance equity and leverage in a manner that optimizes 
capital structure. Maximizing tax benefits and minimizing financial distress costs, 
which occur with increased leverage, achieves the optimal capital structure. The 
value of a firm characterized with leverage is expressed by the following:  
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where VL are firm value with leverage, and VU are firm value without leveraged. 
Comparing this theory with MMs irrelevance proposition, the main difference is the 
potential benefits and costs of debt.  
4.3 Asymmetric information and capital structure 
In financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly profound. There is a 
fair amount of empirical evidence suggesting that stocks often are issued under 
unequal access to information. Managers have private information about the firm’s 
prospects that outside investors do not have access to. According to Milton Harris 
and Artur Raviv (1991), one potential determinant of capital structure is 
asymmetrical information. Several researches have studied how asymmetrical 
information affects the choice of the firm’s capital structure. 
4.3.1 The lemons problem 
One of the most important contributions to the literature on asymmetric information 
is George Akerlof’s paper “The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism”. His main point was that if a buyer are not able to observe the 
quality of the product, the buyer are only willing to pay an average price for the 
product. At this price, the only products offered are of low quality, the lemons. This 
is referred to as adverse selection. The same applies in the stock markets, if the 
seller, which in case of an SEO is represented by the firm’s management, have 
superior information compared to outside investors. If investors are not able to 
observe the true value of a firm prior to buying stocks, they will only be willing to pay 
an average price. Consequently, managers will only issue stock if they consider the 
firm overvalued. This problem makes issuing equity costly. (Akerlof, 1970) 
Adverse selection leads to the lemons principle:  
“When a seller has private information about the value of a good, the buyer will 
discount the price they are willing to pay due to adverse selection” (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2014).  
Adverse selection has several important implications for equity issuance. (1) The 
stock price will decline on the announcement of an equity issue due to the signal 
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that the equity may be overpriced. (2) The stock price tends to rise (relative to the 
market) prior to the announcement of an equity issue, as the firm delay the issue 
until positive information becomes public, and (3) firms tend to issue equity when 
information asymmetries are minimized in order communicate its true firm value.  
4.3.2 The Pecking order theory  
In the article “The Pecking Order, Debt Capacity, and Information Asymmetry 
(1984), Myers and Majluf introduced the pecking order theory. The theory asserts 
that firms adhere to a hierarchy of financing sources and prefer retained earnings 
(internal financing) to debt, and debt to equity. Raising equity is presumed to be a 
“last resort” solution, and is implemented when it is no longer sensible to issue any 
more debt. The theory postulates that equity is less preferred due to information 
asymmetry (adverse selection). Investors will place a lower value to the new equity 
issued, which makes issuing equity costly.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that if there are asymmetrical information between 
investors and managers, then equity could be mispriced by the market. As a result, 
if firms are required to finance a growth opportunity by issuing equity, underpricing 
may be so severe that new investors capture excess return, while existing 
shareholders experience a net loss. Thus, the firm will reject the opportunity, as they 
want to protect existing shareholders. In the literature, this problem is referred to as 
the underinvestment problem, and can be avoided using external financing which 
are not mispriced by the market (undervalued). On the other hand, in a perfect 
capital market where there is no asymmetrical information, the opportunity would 
have been accepted (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
4.3.3 The market-timing hypothesis  
The pecking-order hypothesis does not provide a clear prediction regarding a firm’s 
overall capital structure, aside from a general preference of financing sources. The 
firm’s overall capital structure will also depend on whether the firm’s management 
believe that the firm is currently under- or overpriced. This is referred to as the 
market-timing hypothesis (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). According to this theory, SEOs 
are motivated primarily by managers' desire to take advantage of open financing 
windows to sell overvalued equity. Empirical studies show that the market-timing 
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hypothesis has a statistically significant influence on the decision to conduct an 
SEO. (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) 
Furthermore, it has previously been conducted an interesting study about the 
interaction between the market-timing hypothesis and the pecking order in the 
financing decision of firms. A brief summary of this study is found in the appendix 
chapter 12.1.1.  
4.3.4 Time-varying adverse selection  
The time-varying adverse selection is a dynamic analogue of the static pecking 
order theory. According to this explanation, firms will issue equity when stock prices 
are high if a high stock price coincides with low adverse selection. According to 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), firms could see periods of low asymmetric 
information as a window of opportunity to issue equity. They define window of 
opportunity to exist when the information asymmetry is at historically low levels in 
the whole economy. In such periods, firms are able to signal their value and intent to 
investors more precisely.  
Due to the shortcomings of the trade-off and pecking order theory, the market-timing 
hypothesis and time-varying adverse selection has become the more prominent 
theoretical explanations behind SEOs. (Fama & French, 2005) 
4.4 The efficient market hypothesis  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is based on the idea that the competition 
among investors works to eliminate all positive-NPV trading opportunities (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2014). According to this hypothesis, the market will adapt to new 
information when it becomes available to the market. As we regard an equity issue 
as new information, we find it relevant to go thoroughly through the concept of 
efficiency in order to predict the effects that the news of an equity issue may have 
on the stock price. We will later in chapter 8.1, tie the market efficiency hypothesis 
together with the event study.  
From the introduction, we recognized that the degree of efficiency in the market is 
highly dependent on analysts and investors. If the market consists of numerous 
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analysts and investors, the efficiency in the market would be strong (Bodie et al., 
2014). Conversely, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue, based on their study that 
investors are only motivated to analyze and search for new information if this can 
result in excess return. Due to their findings, Grossman and Stiglitz presented a 
model of market efficiency, where the equilibrium consists of a certain degree of 
disequilibrium. The model indicates that the stock price only partly reflects new 
information, and that those who analyze and search for new information will gain 
accordingly. 
According to Fama (1970), there are three forms of the EMH: weak, semi-strong 
and strong market efficiency. The weak form of the EMH states that prices only 
reflect historical information. In other words, you cannot beat the market by looking 
at charts and graphs. The semi-strong form of the EMH says that returns in the 
market reflect all publicly available information. Meaning that whenever an 
announcement occurs in the market, the stock prices will move to reflect this. At 
last, the stock prices in a strong efficient market will contain both public and private 
information.   
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5. Equity issues  
5.1 Introduction & Seasonal equity offering (SEO) 
In today’s business environment, firms are dependent of external capital as retained 
earnings not always are sufficient. Firms are reliant on being able to fund value 
enhancing growth investments, or to strengthen their liquidity situation. To raise 
external capital, firms can either issue debt or seek potential investors in the stock 
market. However, it is not always feasible for firms to take on more debt and they 
have to turn to the equity market.  
Definition:  
“New equity issued by a firm whose stocks are already publicly traded. All equity 
issues occurring after an IPO can be regarded as SEOs, where an IPO is defined as 
the process of selling stock to the public for the first time” 
-  (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014) 
SEOs may involve shares sold to existing shareholders (rights offer), new shares (a 
cash offer) or both. With a rights issue existing shareholders have the privilege to 
buy a specified number of new shares in the firm at a specific price within a 
subscription period. If all existing shareholders are offered to buy the same number 
of new shares at the same price, and all shareholders choose to exercise their right, 
there will be no dilution effect. Thus, rights offerings offset the dilutive effect, 
meaning that existing shareholders are protected from underpricing. Contrary, in a 
cash offer the firm offers the new shares for general sale. As a result, the firm’s 
existing shareholders will see its stock value diluted. Alternatively, the firm could 
choose to issue stocks to a relative small number of selected investors. This is 
referred to as a private placement, and investors involved are usually large banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds.  
5.1.1 Dilution   
As stated above, existing shareholders may be subject to a dilution effect when the 
firm issue new shares. An increase in the number of outstanding shares can result 
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in altered ownership share, control, earnings, and value per stock. On the contrary, 
in a perfect capital market issuing new shares will not result in a dilution effect. As 
long as the firm is selling the new shares at a fair price, the issue will neither result 
in a loss or gain for the existing shareholders. This is a result from increased assets, 
which will offset the dilution effect (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).  
To avoid undergoing the costly issuance process more than once, SEOs are often 
priced with a discount. This makes the issue more attractive to new investors, thus 
increasing the probability of successfully raising the targeted amount. Discounted 
prices will however have consequences for existing shareholders, where the value 
for existing shareholders automatically becomes diluted. However, if the firm 
manage to reinvest the capital raised for equal or greater returns than the capital 
requirement then the issue of new stocks will not result in dilution. In order to 
accomplish this, the firm have to convince investors to take part in the issue without 
the discount, and it is necessary that the firm is able to signalize to the market it has 
unique investment-/growth opportunities in the near future.  
5.1.2 Equity issue in perfect capital markets  
According to Asquith and Mullins, (1986, 1), firms should not be reluctant to issue 
equity in large, efficient capital markets. Asquith and Mullins argue that this is due to 
investor’s many possible investment opportunities, and each firm’s assets 
constitutes only a fraction of the total assets available. This means that there exists 
a large variety of approximate substitutes, which makes the demand curve for a 
firm’s stock in a strong efficient market close to horizontal. Firms are thereby not 
dependent of a price discount to attract new investors, and should instead be able to 
issue new stocks to the current market price.  
In a perfect capital market, the firm value is determined based on expected future 
cash flows. If investors base the value of a stock in accordance with expected future 
cash flows, the dilution effect in earnings will be disregarded. Consequently, as long 
as the firm generates sufficient returns on the new capital, the stock price should 
remain unchanged in a perfect capital market, with full efficiency (Asquith & Mullins 
1986, 1).  
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5.2 The stock price behavior around equity issues – 
previous studies  
In this chapter, we will introduce a brief overview of earlier studies related to the 
stock price behavior around the equity issue. In the study conducted by Korajcyk et 
al., (1990) the stock’s return over and above the return on an equal-weighted index 
are displayed 500 days preceding and 100 days following the announcement. The 
sample used in the study is the New York Stock Exchange and the American 
Exchange (NYSE/AMEX). The results retrieved from the study can be summarized 
by:  
1 A cumulative excess return for the NYSE/AMEX firms of 43.8 % 500 days 
prior to the issue announcement.  
2 Whereas in the event window (-2, 2) of the equity issue announcement, 
there was an abnormal return of 3.0 % for the same selection.  
 
Asquith and Mullins (2) (1986), and Masulis and Korwar (1986) findings are 
consistent with the results summarized above. In addition, Barclay and Litzenberger 
(1988) support the results on the short-term price drop of the equity issue 
announcement.  
 
We are in the following going to present studies related to the announcement effect 
of SEOs. According to several researchers, the market reaction to the 
announcement of an SEO is on average a price decline of about 3 %. These 
findings are consistent with the theory of adverse selection, which as mentioned 
earlier, indicates that firms want to protect existing shareholders against dilution of 
earnings and tend to issue new equity when they believe their stocks are 
overvalued. Since investors in the market are aware of this mindset, the 
consequences of announcing an equity issue is accordingly a stock price reduction. 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).  
 
Carlson et al., (2006), shares another possible explanation for the stock price 
behavior. They argue that the behavior of the stock price may not have to do with 
the actual SEO announcement, but instead are explained by the conditions that led 
the firm to conduct the SEO. When a firm decides to raise external capital it is often 
because the firm plans to fund strategic growth opportunities, or in some cases 
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because the firm are close to covenant breach. This hypothesis focuses on growth 
issues, and explains the observed price drop by the decrease in the firm’s beta, 
which is a consequence of the new investments with higher risk. Researchers have 
found empirical support for this hypothesis (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).  
5.2.1 Other hypothesis to the announcement effect 
The price-pressure hypothesis 
Myron Scholes introduced in the article “The Market for Securities: Substitutions 
Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices” (1972) the 
price-pressure hypothesis. He explains the observed drop in the stock price by a 
falling demand curve. This is based on the view that all firms are unique, and there 
are no perfect substitutions in the market. Due to this, the selling price needs to be 
below the current market price in order to attract new buyers.  
The investment opportunity hypothesis 
Miller and Rock (1985) explained the sudden price drop following the news of an 
equity issue by the signaling effect of firm’s lack of capital. On the other hand, if 
firms have the opportunity to make investments that will increase firm value, this will 
most likely result in a positive market reaction to the news of an equity issue.  
The wasteful investment hypothesis 
The investment opportunity hypothesis may be associated with the Wasteful 
investment hypothesis presented by Barclay and Litzenberger (1988). The 
hypothesis states that if a firm unexpectedly issues equity, this is a signal of 
investments opportunities. If the net present value of these investments are below 
zero, the stock price will drop. Furthermore, the size of the value destruction are 
dependent on the size of the new equity issue. However, if the capital raised is used 
to pay off debt, the issue will not affect the stock price. 
5.3 A selection of earlier event-studies  
We will in the following present previous event studies done in relation to the 
announcement effect on stock prices. The selected studies, summarized in table 
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5.1, do however not differentiate between expected- and unexpected SEOs, and will 
be used only as a general benchmark for our results. Although the research periods 
varies a lot, all studies show the result of negative abnormal return following the 
announcement of an SEO.  
Table 5.1 
Study Published Market Sectors Period
Number 
of Issues
Event 
Window CAAR
Asquith and Mulins 1983 NYSE + ASE 1963-1981 531 (-1, 0) -2.70 %
Mikkelson and Partch 1986 NYSE + ASE 1972-1982 (-1, 0) -3.56 %
Masulis and Korwar 1986 NYSE + AMEX Industrials 1963-1980 1406 (-20. 21) -3.25 %
Public Utility (-20. 21) -0.68 %
D`Mello et. al. 2003 USA 1979-1996 2286 (-1, 1) -1.20 %
Industrials (-1, 1) -1.50 %
Utility (-1, 1) -0.77 %
Finance (-1, 1) -0.81 %
Wang 2011 USA 1984-2006 3045 (-1, 1) -2.84 %  
Asquith and Mullins (1986, 1) found that the price drop following the issue was 
correlated with the size of the SEO. A larger issue resulted in a greater value 
destruction of the respective firm. In contrast, Mikkelson and Parch (1986) did not 
find any relationship between the size of the issue and the firm’s value destruction. 
Additionally, Asquith and Mullins also looked into the relative performance of the 
stock both before and after the issue. In the two years prior to the issue the 
accumulated excess return of the stock was 33 %. Whereas in the two years 
succeeding the issue the excess return dropped to -6 %.  
Masulis and Korwar (1986) explored the circumstances surrounding the equity 
issue. In particular, they examined the effect from how the firm used their proceeds 
on the stock price. The results showed a significant drop in stock prices for both 
firms related to the industrial sector and the publicly utility sector. Their findings 
suggested that firms within the industrial sector experienced a larger stock price 
drop compared with those belonging to the public utility sector.  
In 2003 D`Mallo et al. conducted a study on the relationship between the 
announcement effect and the sequence of SEOs conducted by industrial, utilities 
and financial institutions. He found that the drop in market value was largest for 
firms related to the industrial sector and smallest for firms within the utility sector. 
This is in line with what Masulis and Korwar (1986) found in their study. 
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Yuequan Wang (2011) shows in his study a positive significant correlation between 
earnings timeliness and the abnormal return following an equity issue. This means 
that firms more punctual in their earnings announcements experience less of a price 
reduction during an equity issue. Wang believed this was due to less information 
asymmetry between the firm and their investors.  
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Event study   
The aim of this chapter is to give a description of the quantitative research 
methodology we have applied to answer our stated hypotheses. Based on 
MacKinlay (1997), which claims the following: “A measure regarding the effects of 
an economic event on the value of a firm can be constructed straightforwardly using 
an event study” we have decided to conduct an event study. 
We will follow the approach used in the article “Event studies in Economic and 
Finance” (MacKinlay, 1997). Roughly, the structure involves estimating what the 
normal stock return would be around the event, given that the event did not take 
place, and deducting this from the actual return. We then end up with the abnormal 
return.  
6.1.1 Underlying assumption   
The main requirement of an event study is an efficient stock market. This implies 
that stock prices react quickly and accurately to new information. If the stock prices 
do not react quickly to new information, then we do not know that the event actually 
affected the stock price. A basic assumption underlying the event study is that the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) holds. The usefulness of the study 
depends on this assumption.  
6.1.2 Procedure for an event study  
There is no unique structure of an event study, but there is a general flow of 
analysis. Before we go deeper into this flow, we will introduce some important 
notations:  
     the event time where returns will be indexed  
     the event date 
   represents the event window 
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  the estimation window  
   post-event window (if applicable)  
   the length of the estimation window 
   the length of the event window  
   the length of the post-event window (if applicable) 
6.1.3 Event window  
When conducting an event study an event window needs to be defined. This is the 
period where the stock price of the firms involved in the event of interest will be 
examined. We will discuss the events of interest in chapter 7.3.1. According to the 
EMH, events based on publically available information should be incorporated in the 
stock price immediately. Thus, one should ideally use a one-day event window.  
However, it is usual to apply an event window larger than the exact event of interest. 
A larger event window permits examination of periods surrounding the event. 
MacKinlay (1997) & Peterson (1989) also suggest doing several test with different 
event windows, because the market may not always be efficient. On the other hand, 
there are some weaknesses by choosing a large event window. For instance, 
McWilliams & Siegel (1997), argue that choosing a longer event window creates a 
problem related to controlling for the actual effects of the event. Brown & Warner, 
1985 states that a longer event window severely reduces the power of the test 
statistics, which may lead to false inferences about the significance of an event. 
Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that the short event window 
usually captures the effect of an event (Netter & Ryngaert, 1990), (Dann, et al., 
1977) & (Mitchell & Netter, 1989).  
6.1.4  Estimation window  
In order to assess the event’s impact we need to have a measure of the abnormal 
return. The abnormal return is defined as the actual ex post return of the stock over 
the event window minus the normal return of the firm over the same period. Where 
the normal return are the expected return not affected by the event. (MacKinlay, 
1997). There are two requirements for estimating the normal return. First, to 
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estimate the normal performance we need to define an estimation window. 
Secondly, we have to choose which model to use to estimate the normal return. The 
latter requirement is discussed in the appendix chapter 12.2.1.  
The estimation window should be long enough to estimate reliable abnormal 
returns. In addition, it is not usual that the event window is included in the estimation 
window. This is to prevent that the event itself will influence the normal performance 
model parameter estimates (MacKinlay, 1997). MacKinlay (1997) and, Brown and 
Warner (1985) recommend using an estimation window of 200 trading days. At last, 
we have decided to disregard the possibility of including a post-event window, and 
we will therefore not go further into this part of the methodology.  
 
Figure 6.1 
The approach of how to model normal return, abnormal return and the average 
cumulative abnormal return are described in detail in the appendix chapter 12.2.1 
and 12.2.2.  
6.2 Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal return  
In order to investigate if there are certain criteria that can explain the observed 
abnormal return, it is possible to run a cross sectional analysis. This type of analysis 
is conducted at a specific point in time, and returns a p-value indicating whether the 
independent variables have a significant effect on the dependent variable. We will 
conduct two different types of cross-sectional studies. The first one is the two-
sample t-test for independent observations, whereas the second one is an ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS). The description of these methods are presented in 
the appendix chapter 12.2.4 and 12.2.5.    
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6.3 Weaknesses of linear square regression  
There are some limitations and pitfalls when applying the least square regression. 
The most common problems related to the least square regression is outlier 
sensitivity, non-linearity, too many independent variables, dependence among 
variables, heteroscedasticity, and noise in the independent variables (variances in 
independent variables). In the following paragraphs, we will go through each of 
them. All information is based on the article “Problems of Linear Least Square 
Regression” by Burger and Repisky (2012).  
6.3.1 Outlier sensitivity 
Outliers are data points within the dataset, which are deviating in extreme from all 
the other values. The weakness of the least square regression is that it is highly 
sensitive to such outliers. The regression can perform very poorly when the dataset 
contains excessively large or small values for the dependent variable compared to 
the rest of the values. Since the method’s objective is to minimize the sum of the 
squared error, any outlier will have a disproportionately large effect on the resulting 
constants that are being solved for.  
6.3.2 Non-linearity 
Linear models always attempt to place a line through one-dimensional data sets that 
fits the best through two-dimensional data sets respectively. Furthermore, in higher 
dimensional datasets a generalization of a plane (i.e. a hyperplane) are used. Due 
to this, the least square regression, in fact all linear regression methods, suffer from 
the major drawback that most systems are not linear in the real world. 
6.3.3 Too many independent variables 
It is logical to believe that the more information we have about what we are trying to 
model, the easier it should be to make predictions about it. Burger and Repisky 
argue that the opposite occasionally can be the case. According to their study, many 
algorithms suffer from the problem that a higher number of available information can 
lead to worse results, under certain conditions. The least square regression method 
is in particular disposed to the problem, where it is usually good to have a large 
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amount of data in the dataset, there can be created serious difficulties if to many 
independent variables are included. Hence, instead of including every independent 
variable available into the regression model, it is recommended to focus on those 
that are likely to be good predictors of the output variable. This will increase the 
possibility that the least square solution is unique. 
6.3.4 Dependence among independent variables 
If the independent variables are significantly correlated with each other, the least 
square method may sometimes according to Burger and Repisky lead to poor 
predictions.  
6.3.5 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is defined as the data points in the dataset that have unequal 
variances in their values along the feature axis. The existence of heteroscedasticity 
means that some data points are more likely to be affected by noise than other data 
points, which in return makes the data points exposed for heteroscedasticity less 
reliable than the rest.  
6.3.6 Variance/noise in the independent variables 
Another problem related to the least square regression model is that it is designed 
to comprehend variances or errors in the dependent variable, and not for the 
independent variable. The existence of noise in the independent feature variable 
can arise for several reasons, depending on the context, including among other 
things measurement errors, transcription error , rounding error, or uncertainty in the 
object that are being studied.   
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7. Description of the datasets  
In this chapter, we will go through our applied datasets. Dataset 1 contains a group 
of firms that represents SEOs that are defined as expected, and dataset 2 is a 
selection of firms that represents SEOs that are defined as unexpected. In total, we 
have a selection of 81 SEOs, including both private placements and rights issues. 
Out of these, 69 are derived from the Oslo Stock Exchange and 12 from the Oslo 
Axess, registered for the period between 2011 and August 2015.  For the completed 
list of included SEOs, see appendix chapter 12.3.  
The datasets are composed of SEOs fulfilling the following criteria:  
 The firm had at the time of the issue, been listed on either the Oslo Stock 
Exchange or the Oslo Axess for at least 250 days prior to the event dates.  
 The size of the issue was at least NOK 100 million.  
 The issue constituted at least 5 % of the firm’s market capitalization on the 
day prior to the announcement.  
Throughout the rest of our thesis, we will refer to the group of firms consisting of 
expected SEOs as expected SEOs, and the group of firms representing unexpected 
SEOs as unexpected SEOs.  
7.1 Datasets  
7.1.1 Dataset 1  
Dataset 1 consist of expected SEOs. In order to analyze whether the SEO was 
expected or not, we created several key words, which we considered as possible 
indicators of a near- or medium term SEO. The process entailed looking for 
keywords utilizing equity- and credit research, firm’s press releases and quarterly 
reports, and news articles. If we observed any of the keywords or other indications 
prior to the announcement date, the SEO fulfilled the criteria for dataset 1. The most 
commonly used keywords are presented below. 
 29 
 Breach of covenant – if a firm is in breach of covenant, it means that the 
firm is not able to meet their debt obligations. 
 
 Waiver – when a firm is close to being in breach of covenant the issuer of 
the firm’s debt obligation may grant the firm a waiver, which can be 
described as new conditions to fulfill their obligation. 
 
 Liquidity constraint – if a firm has liquidity constraints then the firm is in 
lack of cash.   
 
 Refinancing needs – refers to the replacement of an existing debt 
obligation with either new debt under different terms, or equity. 
 
 Stretched loan – is a loan that is extended to firms in direct need of 
financing, and it requires a large portion of the firm’s cash flows to service. 
The benchmark is usually 50 % of the firm’s gross income or more. 
 
 Negative cash balance estimates – this may indicate that the firm will be 
in need of cash in the near- or medium term, depending on how far ahead 
the forecast is.  
7.1.2 Dataset 2 
Dataset 2 consist of SEOs that we have not identified as expected prior to the 
announcement. We defined an SEO as unexpected if no keywords and no other 
indications of an upcoming issue appeared prior to the announcement date. 
7.2 Composition of the datasets   
We find it relevant to go briefly through the composition of industries in our datasets. 
As observed from table 7.1, the largest difference between the dataset is that 
dataset 1 is more tilted towards oil exploration and production, while dataset 2 is 
more tilted towards information technology and health care.   
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Table 7.1 
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 OSEBX
Oil Exploration and Production 30.0 % 3.2 % 17.7 %
Finance 12.0 % 3.2 % 16.8 %
Materials 2.0 % 3.2 % 13.3 %
Consumer Staples 4.0 % 3.2 % 9.7 %
Oil Service 26.0 % 22.6 % 8.9 %
Information Technology 10.0 % 29.0 % 3.9 %
Industrials 4.0 % 9.7 % 3.7 %
Shipping 12.0 % 6.5 % 1.9 %
Real Estate - 6.5 % 1.5 %
Health Care - 12.9 % 0.2 %
Telecommunications - - 12.6 %
Consumer Discretionary - - 9.6 %
Utilities - - 0.2 %
 
Although dataset 1 and 2 is a composition of SEOs from various industries, the 
breakdown into industries does not perfectly replicate the OSEBX index. In that 
matter, our results cannot immediately be generalized to the Oslo Stock Exchange 
as a whole.  
In table 7.2, we present the average market capitalization for both datasets. This 
shows that the average size of the firms in each dataset were similar, and that the 
difference in results for the respective datasets can not be explained by differences 
in market capitalization.  
Table 7.2 
Expected Unexpected
Market capitalization 2 954 504 770 4 250 018 513  
7.3 Choice of event date, event window and estimation 
window  
In chapter 6.1, we went through the process of choosing the event- and estimation 
window. In this section, we specify our choice of event dates, and event- and 
estimation windows.  
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7.3.1 Event dates  
The events of interest are respectively the date when the market first expect the 
SEO and the date of the announcement. For the event date “expectation” we will 
only apply dataset 1 (expected SEOs), whereas for the event date “announcement” 
we will apply both datasets. Conducting three different event studies, allows us to 
compare the difference in stock price reaction for expected SEOs on both event 
dates, and in addition observe the difference between expected- and unexpected 
SEOs on the announcement date.  
The selected expectation date was the date the first keyword indicating a near- or 
medium term SEO appeared. For the announcement date, we utilized Newsweb 
and press releases. We found this approach the most suitable as it gives the most 
accurate announcement date.  
7.3.2 Event window  
Particularly due to the high uncertainty surrounding the exact expectation date of the 
SEOs, we decided to apply several estimation windows. From chapter 4.4, we 
know, depending on the degree of efficiency, that the market may use some time 
adjusting to new information. Consequently, we find it useful to include event 
windows consisting of both days prior to and succeeding the event date. 
Additionally, by using larger event windows, we are able to increase the probability 
of including the “true date” for when the SEOs are expected by the market. Although 
there is less uncertainty related to the announcement date, we decided to employ 
the same event windows in order to see the development in abnormal return. We 
have chosen the following event windows:  
 From 20 days prior to until 20 days succeeding the event date (-20,20) 
 From 10 days prior to until 10 days succeeding the event date (-10,10) 
 From 5 days prior to until 5 days succeeding the event date (-5,5) 
 From 2 days prior to until 2 days succeeding the event date (-2,2) 
 From 1 day prior to until 1 day succeeding the event date (-1,1) 
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 From 1 day prior to until 5 days succeeding the event date (-1,5) 
 From 1 day prior to until 10 days succeeding the event date (-1,10) 
7.3.3 Estimation window  
As mention in section 6.1.4, several academics recommend to use an estimation 
window of 200 trading days. However, due to the lack of available stock data we 
applied an estimation window of 190 days (going from 220 to 30 days before the 
event date). Lastly, we decided to disregard the possibility of including a post event-
window as we found it necessary to delineate our study.  
7.3.4 The market index  
From the appendix chapter 12.2, we know that in order to estimate normal returns 
we have to define a market portfolio. We are using the Oslo Børs Benchmark Index 
(OSEBX) as an approximate to the market portfolio. This is a natural choice since 
the majority of or data consist of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
7.4 Limitations of a small sample size  
When presenting and interpreting our results, it is important to have knowledge of 
the limitations of using a small sample size. The limitations created by a small 
sample size can have profound effects on the outcome and worth of the study. One 
or two firms may have extremely detrimental effects on the empirical results while 
using a limited number of event observations (MacKinlay, 1997). We will in the 
following present the main problems by applying a small sample size.  
The problem concerning the small sample size is the influence it has on the 
descriptive statistics. The ability of a statistical test to show features that truly exist 
in the observations declines when the size of the sample declines. The 
interpretation of results, in particular the p-value, may be a concern. The p-value 
determines if the statistical test is significant or not, referring to whether or not a 
difference is large enough to matter. With a small sample size, the ability to detect 
such significant differences between observed values becomes weaker.  
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Another major problem is that a small sample size may produce false-positive 
results, or overestimate the magnitude of a relationship. This is referred to as a type 
II error. Since statistical test provide results in terms of either rejecting or accepting 
the hypothesis, using a small sample may result in rejecting (accepting) a 
hypothesis that should be accepted (rejected). (Hackshaw, 2008) and (Veria, n.d.) 
7.5 Excluded data  
Among the SEOs that fulfilled the criteria stated in chapter 7, we have excluded six 
observations. Two expected and four unexpected SEOs. The reason for why we 
excluded these is summarized in table 7.3.  
Table 7.3 
Company Reason
Seabird Exploration Not traded in the event window up until announcement
Sevan Marine Experience extreme returns in the estimation window
American Shipping Company Experience extreme returns in the estimation window
Aker Philadelphia Shipyard Experience extreme returns in the estimation window
Domstein Not traded in the latter part of the event window
Saga Tankers Not traded in the primary parts of the event window
 
Seabird Exploration (SBX) is a classical example of an SEO conducted to keep the 
firm floating (liquid). The firm was not trading the days prior to the announcement 
date due to a suspension. SBX was not able to repay their outstanding bonds, and 
was basically bankrupt. The first day SBX was permitted to trade on the stock 
exchange after the suspension was on the actual announcement date. On this 
particular date, SBX announced a restructuring plan containing among other things 
the expected SEO, resulting in a 70 % reduction of market value.  
To get a better understanding of our data sample, we examined the computed 
CAAR when excluding the highest positive and negative observations. The 
exclusion was based on the CAAR in the event window (-10, 10) for both expected- 
and unexpected SEOs on the announcement date. By excluding all observations 
showing CAAR greater or less than +/- 30 %, we excluded nine observations from 
dataset 1 and seven from dataset 2. For the results, see appendix chapter 12.4.1. 
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We chose to do our analysis on the dataset only excluding the observations in the 
table above. The reason for this is that the remaining observations are highly 
relevant for the study, and the exclusion would result in both of our cross-sectional 
analyses returning inconclusive results. In addition, as 1/5 of our combined datasets 
contained observations above or below +/- 30 %, our observations were evenly 
distributed across the scale. 
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8. Event study   
8.1 Expectaton date  
Conducting an event study for the expectation date with respect to dataset 1 
(Expected SEOs), we obtained the following results:  
Table 8.1 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-1.17 % -6.08 % -2.74 % -1.42 % -0.38 % -1.01 % -2.38 %
Median -1.48 % -4.19 % -1.61 % -0.92 % -0.05 % -1.31 % -2.43 %
t-value -0.330 -2.630 -1.660 -1.030 -0.360 -0.750 -1.520
p-value 0.745 0.011 0.103 0.310 0.722 0.454 0.134
Std. Dev. 0.036 0.163 0.117 0.098 0.076 0.094 0.110
Skewness -0.460 -0.579 -0.477 -0.890 -1.287 0.153 -0.546
Excess kurtosis 3.560 0.643 1.436 3.000 3.593 0.313 1.167
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
 
From table 8.1 we found that the average abnormal return, depending on the event 
window, was between -6.08 % and -0.38 %. Where the corresponding median 
values ranged from -4.19 % to -0.05 %. Looking at the different p-values, we 
observe that the only event window statistically significant at a 0.05 level was the 
event window (-10, 10), with a p-value of 0.011. Focusing on the significant event 
window (-10, 10), we found an average abnormal return of -6.08 % and a median 
value of -4.19 %. This may indicate that the existence of outliers were still present. 
Furthermore, we found a negative skewness of -0.579 and excess kurtosis of 0.643. 
This can be interpreted as though the observations were not normally distributed, 
and suffered from a long tailed distribution.  
As we observe an increasing negative CAAR throughout the entire event window (-
10, 10), we found it interesting to compute a graph ranging over a larger period. On 
this basis, we have presented a visual overview of the development in CAAR for 
both the event windows (-10, 10) and (-20, 20).  
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Figure 8.1     Figure 8.2 
From figure 8.1, we observe a gradual negative development in CAAR. This may 
reflect that the expectations related to the near- or medium term SEOs were 
gradually assimilated by the market. This trend may also indicate that the majority of 
the included firms were experiencing negative momentum. The most substantial 
effect was observed on day 0, where the abnormal return constituted a reduction of 
0.87 %. Furthermore, the median value proved to be negative on almost every day 
of the event window. The negative median values imply that the majority of the firms 
in dataset 1 were experiencing a negative stock price reaction throughout the event 
window. This mitigates the concern related to type II errors. Looking at figure 8.2 
presenting the event window (-20, 20), we observe that both prior to and succeeding 
the event window (-10, 10) CAAR had a positive development. We consider the 
stock price reaction observed after day 10 to be either a stabilization effect in the 
market after overreacting to the new information, or an indication that the 
expectations were not adjusted by the market.  
Another key element is to associate our results with the EMH. Most researchers 
argue that the market is semi-strong, and since our data are based on publically 
available information, this suggests that new information should have had an 
immediate effect on the stock price. This is inconsistent with our findings, where no 
evidence of an immediate effect appeared during the event window (-10, 10).  
Table 8.2 contains all SEOs defined as expected. The table presents the different 
key words that indicated the SEO, and the accumulated abnormal return for the 
days (-10, -1), 0 and (1, 10). There was no clear correlation between the observed 
abnormal return and the key words characterizing the SEO as expected. However, 
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the more obvious the need for equity, the more negative the abnormal return tended 
to be.  
Table 8.2 
Observation (-10, -1) 0 (1, 10) Total Key word
Archer -2 % -1 % 8 % 4 % Breach of convenant, need of new capital
Asetek -6 % 14 % -23 % -14 % Still burning cash. Large capital need
Bridge Energy -7 % -4 % 1 % -10 % Potential share issue
Deep Sea Supply 3 % 7 % -1 % 9 % Intention to acquire new-builds
Det Norske Oljeselskap -7 % 0 % 14 % 6 % Need to raise capital by 2012
Det Norske Oljeselskap -3 % -2 % -1 % -6 % Capital needed for committed developments
Det Norske Oljeselskap -7 % 4 % -3 % -6 % Covenant at risk, new capital required anyhow
DNO 13 % -4 % 1 % 9 % Soaring working capital and weak cash flow
DOF -1 % -2 % 0 % -3 % High financial risk, debt/capitalization of 73 %
Dolphin Group -8 % 1 % -27 % -33 % Only in a conservative scenario the company is in need of capital
Eitzen Chemical -9 % -17 % -1 % -28 % The company will run out of cash earlier than expected
Frontline -3 % -6 % -3 % -11 % Liquidity issue
Havila Shipping 1 % -1 % -6 % -5 % Financing of new-builds
Havila Shipping 10 % 2 % -1 % 11 % Close to breaching interest coverage covenant
Höegh LNG Holdings 3 % 3 % 6 % 12 % No room for new-builds unless capital is raised
Interoil Exploration and Production -4 % -2 % -13 % -18 % Negative equity and stressed liquidity
Marine Harvest -18 % -4 % 3 % -18 % Breach of covenant, equity issue cannot be ruled out
Sparebank 1 SMN -3 % 1 % 1 % -1 % Capital requirements are getting tougher
Sparebanken Møre 1 % 1 % -5 % -3 % DNB cuts the interest rate, indicating difficult times ahead
Northland Resources -4 % -3 % -26 % -33 % It's highly likely that a share issue is required
Norse Energy Corp. -15 % -26 % -7 % -48 % The company could face financing requirements
Norse Energy Corp. -42 % 0 % -5 % -47 % Equity covenant waiver. New equity is likely
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge 3 % -1 % 1 % 3 % DNB cuts the interest rate, indicating difficult times ahead
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge 0 % 0 % -1 % -1 % The new Basel-framework approved
Norwegian Energy Company -26 % 0 % 3 % -23 % Stretched balance sheet, covenant issues
Norwegian Energy Company -1 % -4 % 8 % 4 % Covenant risk
North Energy -10 % 0 % 12 % 1 % Need funding for development. Likely source: Equity issue
Polarcus -5 % 2 % 0 % -3 % Covenant at risk
Polarcus -1 % 0 % -6 % -7 % A large equity issue is most likely needed
Polarcus 7 % 2 % 21 % 30 % It's high leverage is not sustainable
Prospector Offshore Drilling 9 % 2 % -7 % 4 % Equity needed for new-builds
Prosafe 2 % 0 % -1 % 1 % Need capital to finance new-builds
Questerre Energy Corporation 18 % -3 % -8 % 6 % Funding risk. Potential dilution effect is significant
Q-Free 13 % 1 % -7 % 7 % Need to secure financing to build infrastructure
Renewable Energy Corporation 4 % -1 % -8 % -5 % May breach covenants and require new financing
Renewable Energy Corporation 10 % -4 % 3 % 8 % Significant debt wall in 2014
REC Silicon 3 % 1 % 14 % 18 % Dependent on getting paid and stop inventory build up
Rocksource 9 % -1 % 18 % 25 % Will face external financing needs
Rocksource -11 % -2 % -6 % -19 % Funding needs
Salmar -22 % 13 % -18 % -26 % Negative cash balance
Scana Industrier 9 % -4 % -11 % -5 % Stressed liquidity
Scana Industrier 14 % -4 % -11 % 0 % Breach of covenants
Sevan Drilling 2 % -1 % -9 % -9 % Covenant waiver
SinOceanic Shipping -30 % 1 % -5 % -34 % Need to raise equity to finance new-builds
Sparebank 1 Østfold Akershus -7 % 0 % -3 % -10 % Capital requirements are getting tougher
Songa Offshore -1 % 1 % 1 % 2 % Further cash is needed
Songa Offshore -7 % -4 % 1 % -9 % Liquidity issue
Spectrum -5 % 1 % -4 % -8 % Assumes financing, probably through equity
Sparebank 1 SR-Bank -1 % 0 % 1 % 0 % The new Basel-framework approved
Wentworth Resources -15 % 0 % -7 % -22 % Liquidity relies on being able to raise capital
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8.2 Announcement date 
In this section, we analyze the stock price reaction on the announcement date by 
applying both dataset 1 (expected SEOs) and dataset 2 (unexpected SEOs). We will 
first go through the results for each test separately, and secondly compare them.  
8.2.1 Expected SEOs 
The results obtained applying dataset 1 on the announcement date are presented in 
table 8.3. Contrary to the earlier event studies showing an abnormal return of 
around 3 %, our results proved to be slightly higher (for earlier studies see chapter 
5.3). This may be a result of distinguishing between expected- and unexpected 
SEOs, as well as a smaller sample size.  
Table 8.3 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-4.41 % -3.12 % -4.57 % -5.04 % -6.69 % -5.16 % -5.64 %
Median -5.97 % -1.15 % -4.43 % -3.39 % -4.50 % -6.69 % -4.04 %
t-value -1.080 -1.000 -1.840 -2.340 -2.870 -2.250 -2.200
p-value 0.286 0.320 0.072 0.024 0.006 0.029 0.032
Std. Dev. 0.041 0.220 0.176 0.152 0.165 0.162 0.181
Skewness -0.188 0.126 -0.266 -1.238 -1.803 -0.700 -0.617
Excess kurtosis 1.304 0.848 1.100 2.905 5.949 1.623 1.453
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
 
Observing CAAR for the selected event windows, we found it to be between -6.69 % 
and -3.12 %, and the median values respectively between -6.69 % and -1.15 %. 
From the p-values in table 8.3, we found that the event windows (-2, 2), (-1, 1), (-1, 
5) and (-1, 10) were statistically significant at a 0.05 level. As we conducted a 
thorough research of each individual announcement date, we expected the most 
significant effect to be found in the shorter event windows. This is supported by our 
descriptive statistics, where we found the most prominent effect in the event window 
(-1, 1), with a p-value of 0.006. The respective CAAR and median value was -6.69 
% and -4.50 %. The difference between the mean and the median value may be 
indicative of some outliers. Moreover, we detect the same bias as mentioned earlier, 
the skewness and the excess kurtosis. The development in CAAR for the event 
window (-10, 10) is illustrated in figure 8.3 when we compare the two datasets. 
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Our results indicated a semi-strong efficiency in the market, where the 
announcement had an immediate effect on the stock price. However, in accordance 
with the EMH we would expect the observed abnormal return to be less negative as 
the event should already be reflected in the stock price. This result may be an 
indication that we were not able to identify expected SEOs.  
8.2.2 Unexpected SEOs 
The results obtained based on dataset 2 on the announcement date are presented 
in table 8.4.  
Table 8.4 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-1.04 % -2.37 % -0.57 % 1.79 % -1.20 % -2.19 % -3.06 %
Median -0.77 % -3.55 % 0.39 % 0.21 % -0.90 % -3.17 % -3.47 %
t-value -0.180 -0.630 -0.200 0.670 -0.480 -0.910 -1.27
p-value 0.859 0.532 0.846 0.511 0.633 0.371 0.212
Std. Dev. 0.058 0.038 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.024
Skewness -0.062 0.171 -1.274 -0.934 -2.951 -1.942 -2.041
Excess kurtosis 1.634 2.051 4.751 4.678 12.651 8.180 8.422
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
 
To our surprise, we found that the CAAR for all event windows were smaller for 
unexpected SEOs in comparison with expected SEOs. This means that the 
announcement effect was larger for expected SEOs. Clearly, there has to be some 
other explanation for this result. One possible explanation is that the SEOs in 
dataset 1 (expected SEOs) are composed by a majority of firms in need of capital 
due to liquidity problems, whereas dataset 2 (unexpected SEOs) are more 
associated with investment opportunities. This is a result from the key words used to 
identify expected SEOs, where most are related to negative momentum.  
Figure 8.3 and 8.4 illustrates the development in CAAR for both expected- and 
unexpected SEOs for event window (-10, 10).  
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Figure 8.3 – Expected   Figure 8.4 - Unexpected 
By comparing the two figures, it is clear that the announcement effect was greater 
for expected SEOs. We observe a value destruction for expected SEOs on day 0, 
with an abnormal return equal to -4.30 %. For the unexpected SEOs, we did not 
observe the usual pattern around the announcement date. The return proved to be 
volatile, and we found the largest effect to appear on day 1, with an abnormal return 
of -2.49 %. However, day 1 is followed by a positive stock price reaction before it 
falls again after day 2.  
8.3 Testing the abnormal return 
In order to answer whether the observed announcement effect was significantly 
different for unexpected- and expected SEOs, we tested the observed abnormal 
return for the two data samples. The test was conducted on the event-window (10, 
10). 
In table 8.5, we have performed a t-test on the observed announcement effect for 
expected- and unexpected SEOs. 
Table 8.5 
Expected (0) Unexpected (1) 0-1
-3.12 % -2.37 % -0.75 %
Median -1.15 % -3.55 % 2.40 %
t-value -0.153
p-value 0.439
N 50 31 81
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As shown in table 8.5, expected SEOs experienced a greater fall in market value. 
This is contrary to what we expected to find. However, the difference in CAAR of -
0.75 % was not statistically significant. Form the median values, we found that 
unexpected SEOs experienced the largest abnormal return. Due to the differences 
in the observed mean and median values, we decided to test the median. For this 
matter, we utilized the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, see appendix 12.2.3. Table 8.7 
presents the obtained results, with a p-value of 0.9613. This indicates that the 
difference in median values was not statistically significant, and we were not able to 
conclude with any significant difference in returns between the two groups. 
Table 8.6 
Expected Unexpected
Ranksum 2039 1282
Expected 2050 1271
z 0.107
Prob > |z| 0.9149
 
We observe a difference in the experienced abnormal return between expected- and 
unexpected SEOs. However, the difference was not significant, and we found no 
evidence supporting our hypothesis claiming that expected SEOs would experience 
a less profound fall in market value on the announcement date.   
8.4 Rebased analysis 
Until this point in the analysis, we have examined the abnormal return around the 
expectation- and the announcement date. However, it would be interesting to try to 
explain the effects on the stock returns for a larger timeframe around these dates, 
and how the development was different for expected- and unexpected SEOs. In this 
part of the analysis, we utilized both datasets.  
In the following, we have performed a rebased analysis comparing the performance 
of both datasets with OSEBX. This makes it possible to analyze the relative 
performance of the sample in comparison to the index. We have plotted the stock 
performance rebased at time zero, where time zero represents the date of 
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execution. The execution date is an interesting date for investors considering buying 
stocks in a firm where a private placement is expected. This date is represented by 
the date that the book building closed. The results proved to be driven by some 
extreme observations. In order to give a more “normalized picture” of the 
performance, we excluded the firms that more than tripled in value or lost more than 
66 % in the period before or after the execution date. Table 8.7 represents the list of 
excluded observations. The figures prior to excluding the observations, can be 
found in the appendix chapter 12.4.2. 
Table 8.7 
Ticker Date
Expected
Asetek 25.02.2015
Dolphin Group 22.04.2015
Interoil Exploration and Production 13.03.2013
Norse Energy Corp. 25.03.2011
Norse Energy Corp. 17.02.2012
Norwegian Energy Company 23.10.2013
Polarcus 07.10.2014
Renewable Energy Company 27.07.2012
Scana Industrier 03.02.2012
Scana Industrier 29.06.2015
Unexpected
Idex 03.01.2014
Siem Offshore 02.09.2015
Thin Film Electrinics 30.10.2013
Weifa 03.09.2014
Weifa 10.09.2014
 
In figure 8.5 and 8.6, we plotted the return for the expected- and unexpected SEOs. 
The x-axis displays the number of days relative to time zero, where the y-axis 
consists of the rebased value of both the sample and the OSEBX. The figures 
shows the average rebased return for the included firms in the period from 250 
weekdays prior to the issue, until 250 weekdays after the issue. We used weekdays 
as a proxy for trading days since this made it easier to apply this type of analysis. 
Concerning the weekdays that were not trading days, we brought forward the last 
value prior to that day. 
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Figure 8.5 – Expected   Figure 8.6 – Unexpected 
Prior to the execution date, we observe a high degree of underperformance for the 
expected SEOs. However, after the execution we observe a slightly positive trend 
towards the long-term OSEBX growth. For unexpected SEOs, the trend was very 
different. In contrast to the results for expected SEOs, we found that the stocks in 
this selection perform better prior to the execution date and more poorly after. 
The negative return observed in figure 8.5, strengthens our impression that dataset 
1 contains a majority of firms experiencing a negative momentum. The stabilization 
effect observed in the same dataset succeeding the issue may be explained by a 
reduction in uncertainty concerning the firm’s liquidity problems. However, if this was 
the case we would expect to find a more immediate reaction after the execution 
date. On the other hand, the figure presenting unexpected SEOs surprisingly 
indicates a negative development succeeding the execution date. We expected to 
see a more positive trend, as the majority of the firms in dataset 2 are connected to 
growth issues.  
As our sample is small, these observations may not show the true development of 
expected- and unexpected SEOs. In addition, the obtained observations may also 
be a result of random chance. 
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9. Cross-sectional analysis 
9.1 Independent two-sample t-test  
In this chapter, we explore the factors behind the observed abnormal return for both 
event dates applying both dataset 1 (expected SEOs) and dataset 2 (unexpected 
SEOs). In order to perform the two-sample t-test, we divided the observations from 
both datasets into two separate parts based on firm characteristics. For continuous 
variables, dataset 1 was divided into two groups of 20 and dataset 2 into two groups 
of 14. When testing discrete metrics, the samples were divided accordingly. These 
groups respectively represents the largest- and the smallest observed values for 
each metric tested. We used the t-test to test whether the difference in abnormal 
return between the two groups was statistically significant. Each test was conducted 
using the event window (-10, 10).  
9.1.1 Market capitalization    
There are several explanations for why large-cap firms may receive a different 
market reaction in comparison with small-cap firms. Firstly, it is suggested that the 
market more closely monitors larger firms. When a firm is closely monitored, it is 
reasonable to expect the market to be taken less by surprise when that firm issues 
new equity. In accordance with this, we predict that the stock price of large-cap firms 
will fall less in comparison with small-cap firms. Secondly, the market often 
perceives larger firms as safer. This also supports the prediction that the stock price 
reaction is less profound for large-cap firms. On the other hand, if small-cap firms 
are issuing new equity with the objective to make profitable growth investments, this 
will probably have a greater effect on their future value relative to large-cap firms 
(the investment opportunity hypothesis). This effect is examined in chapter 9.1.2. In 
order to make any inferences about the effect on abnormal return from firm size, we 
have tested the abnormal return of large- and small-cap firms against each other. 
We have the following hypotheses: 
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Where μ(0) and μ(1) represent respectively firms with larger market capitalization 
and firms with smaller market capitalization. H0 states that larger-cap firms will 
experience a less profound effect on their stock price.  
Expected SEOs on expectation date  
Testing for the effects from firm size applying dataset 1 on the expectation date we 
obtained the following results:  
Table 9.1 
Large-cap (0) Small-cap (1) 0-1
-1.00 % -10.85 % 9.85 %
Median -0.33 % -8.95 % 8.62 %
t-value 2.079
p-value 0.023
N 20 20 40
 
It is quite clear from our descriptive statistics that small-cap firms, with a CAAR of -
10.85 %, experienced a larger value destruction relative to the large-cap firms, with 
a CAAR of -1.00 %. With a p-value of 0.023, the difference in CAAR of 9.85 % was 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. We also observed a very low (high) median for 
large-cap (small-cap) firms, which indicates that most of the large-cap (small-cap) 
firms in dataset 1 experienced lower (higher) value destruction. This mitigates the 
uncertainty related to type II errors. Figure 9.1 illustrates the development in CAAR 
for small- and large-cap firms in the event window (-10, 10).  
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Figure 9.1 
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From the figure, we observe that small-cap firms do experience a larger negative 
stock price reaction in comparison with large-cap firms throughout the entire event 
window.  
Expected and unexpected SEOs on announcement date  
In the following, we examine the difference in firm size, and its impact on the 
announcement effect, for both expected and unexpected SEOs. The results 
obtained for each test are presented in table 9.2. We will briefly analyze the results 
from each dataset individually, and at the end compare the results.   
Table 9.2       
Large-cap (0) Small-cap (1) 0-1 Large-cap (0) Small-cap (1) 0-1
2.96 % -10.11 % 13.08 % -3.24 % -7.03 % 3.80 %
Median 0.99 % -8.52 % 9.51 % -2.47 % -3.96 % 1.49 %
t-value 1.900 0.545
p-value 0.033 0.296
N 20 20 40 14 14 28
Expected Unexpected
 
Looking at the results for expected SEOs, we found that the CAAR for small-cap 
and large-cap firms were respectively -10.11% and 2.96 %, constituting a significant 
difference in CAAR of 13.08 %. From the results representing unexpected SEOs, 
we observe a weak analogous tendency. However, with a p-value of 0.296, the 
difference in CAAR of 3.80 % was not statistically significant. Figure 9.2 and 9.3 
presents the development in abnormal return for both expected- and unexpected 
SEOs on announcement using the event window (-10, 10).  
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Figure 9.2 – Expected   Figure 9.3 – Unexpected 
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From what we observe in figure 9.2, it is evident that the announcement creates a 
difference in abnormal returns depending on whether the firm was characterized by 
large-cap or small-cap. The largest effect was found on day 0, where the abnormal 
return for small-cap and large-cap firms was equal to respectively -8.17 % and -0.95 
%. By looking at figure 9.3, we observe indications on a similar trend. However, this 
difference was not large enough to reject our null hypothesis. Comparing expected- 
and unexpected SEOs, we found that the difference in abnormal return was larger 
for expected SEOs relative to those unexpected. This is somewhat surprising, but 
understandable as our event study returned a larger negative abnormal return for 
expected SEOs. 
Analyzing the stock price reaction independently for large-cap and small-cap firms, 
we observe a more negative abnormal return for large-cap firms when the SEO was 
unexpected in comparison with those expected. Whereas small-cap firm 
experienced a larger negative abnormal return when the SEO was expected. We 
find this difference particularly interesting, and it may indicate that expected SEOs in 
large cap firms are sufficiently accounted for in the market. This may be related to 
large cap firms being more closely monitored by the market.  
9.1.2 Growth or crisis  
Referring back to chapter 9.1.1, we would predict a difference in stock price reaction 
for firms issuing new equity in order to make profitable investments (growth issues), 
and firms completing an issue to keep the firm liquid (crisis issues). This coincides 
with the “Investment opportunity hypothesis” explained in chapter 5.2.1. If the firm 
raises capital to make profitable investments, the market will most likely react 
positively to the news of an SEO. However, Carson et al. (2006) argue that stock 
price can drop due to a decrease in the firm’s beta, which is a consequence of the 
higher risk of the new investment. Contrary, if the issue is executed to keep the firm 
liquid, a larger negative stock price reaction is expected. Based on a combination of 
statements from analysts prior to the announcement and statements from the firm 
itself, the SEO is characterized as either a growth- or crisis issue.  
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Our hypotheses are stated above, where crisis- and growth issues are represented 
by μ(0) and μ(1). By grouping our selection of SEOs with respect to these 
characteristics, we located 30 crisis issues and 20 growth issues in dataset 1. The 
equivalent numbers for dataset 2 were 6 and 25.  
Expected SEOs on expectation date  
The results obtained from the t-test carried out for dataset 1 on the expectation date 
are shown in table 9.3.  
Table 9.3 
Crisis (0) Growth (1) 0-1
-8.33 % -2.71 % -5.62 %
Median -5.99 % -0.88 % -5.12 %
t-value -1.269
p-value 0.105
N 30 20 50
 
We found that the negative abnormal return is greater for crisis issues, with a CAAR 
equal to -8.33 %, compared to growth issues where the observed abnormal return 
was - 2.71 %. This is supported by figure 9.3 where we present a visual overview of 
the development in CAAR for the event window (-10, 10). Although the difference in 
abnormal return was quite large, we were not able to disregard our null hypothesis. 
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Figure 9.4 
From figure 9.4, we observe the largest difference to occur on day 0, where the 
abnormal return for crisis- and growth issues were respectively -2.35 % and 1.34 %. 
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Although the difference in CAAR was not found to be significant, the figure 
displayed a different trend for the two groups after day 0.  
Expected and unexpected SEOs on announcement date 
The test completed on the announcement date for expected- and unexpected SEOs 
returned the following results.   
Table 9.4               
Crisis (0) Growth (1) 0-1 Crisis (0) Growth (1) 0-1
-6.68 % 2.22 % -8.89 % -16.42 % 1.00 % -17.42 %
Median -8.52 % 0.84 % -9.36 % -13.25 % -0.34 % -12.92 %
t-value -1.597 -1.512
p-value 0.059 0.091
N 30 20 50 6 25 31
Expected Unexpected
                                                     
For expected SEOs, we observe that crisis issues experienced an abnormal return 
of -6.68 %, whereas growth issues experienced a positive abnormal return of 2.22 
%. We found the same trend for unexpected SEOs, except that the difference in 
CAAR was almost twice the size. From the observed p-values, we are not able to 
reject our null hypothesis for any of the datasets. However, the p-value for expected 
SEOs was close to being significant at a 0.05 level. The high p-value for dataset 2 
may be explained by the small sample of unexpected crisis issues.  
In order to visualize the stock price reaction for both scenarios, we present in figure 
9.5 and 9.6 the development in CAAR for the event window (-10, 10).  
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Figure 9.5 – Expected    Figure 9.6 – Unexpected  
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From figure 9.5, we get a clear picture of the difference in abnormal return between 
growth- and crisis issues for expected SEOs. On day 0, where we found the largest 
effect, both crisis- and growth issues had a negative abnormal return of respectively 
-6.17 % and -1.50 %. For unexpected SEOs, the largest effect also appeared on 
day 0, with abnormal return of -15.38 % for crisis issues and 3.11 % for growth 
issues. Both figures indicate that there was a difference in stock price reaction 
whether the issue was characterized by crisis or growth.    
The trend of expected- and unexpected SEOs proved to be similar for both growth- 
and crisis issues. However, expected SEOs experienced a negative abnormal return 
on day 0, while the same effect for unexpected SEOs was positive. For crisis, 
unexpected equity issues returned a larger negative abnormal return than those 
expected. Note: the results for unexpected SEOs was impacted by two large 
negative observations, which was amplified by a narrow sample of crisis issues.  
9.1.3 Abnormal return for the expected SEOs 
As we in this thesis are interested in the relationship between the abnormal return 
on the expectation date and the announcement date for expected SEOs, we found it 
relevant to examine this in a t-test. In the test, we only applied dataset 1 containing 
expected SEOs. We predict SEOs experiencing a larger abnormal return on the 
expectation date to have a less profound stock price reaction on announcement. 
This is based on our assumption that the market adjusts to new information related 
to the expected SEOs. Our hypotheses are as followed:  
 
 
Where μ(0) represents SEOs with less negative abnormal returns, and μ(1) 
symbolizes SEOs with larger negative abnormal returns. 
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Table 9.5 
Less neg. (0) More neg. (1) 0-1
4.10 % -5.46 % 9.56 %
Median -1.15 % -2.10 % 0.94 %
t-value 1.460
p-value 0.076
N 20 20 40
 
From table 9.5, we observe a positive relationship between the abnormal return on 
the two dates. The firms that experienced a larger negative abnormal return on the 
expectation date also experienced a more negative announcement effect. This is 
the opposite result of what we predicted.  
A probable explanation for this result is that we were not able to identify the correct 
expectation date. In addition, as previously suggested, the dataset applied may 
consist of a majority of firms experiencing negative momentum. In this way, the 
firms suffering from a more negative momentum on the expectation date may still be 
facing the same momentum on announcement. Although the difference was quite 
large, we were not able to reject our null hypothesis. From figure 9.7, we observe a 
difference in the development of the abnormal return. However, on day 0, we 
observe a larger negative abnormal return for firms that experienced less negative 
abnormal return on the expectation date. On the other hand, the group experienced 
a corrective effect in the following days.   
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Figure 9.7 
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9.1.4 Summary of t-tests 
Table 9.6 
[0] [1] [0]-[1] [0] [1] [0]-[1] [0] [1] [0]-[1]
Market cap. -1.00 % -10.85 % 9.85 % 2.96 % -10.11 % 13.08 % -3.24 % -7.03 % 3.80 % Large.cap < Small.cap
Relative size -10.85 % -0.32 % -10.54 % -7.71 % 6.23 % -13.94 % -10.71 % 1.58 % -12.29 % Big size > Small size
Growth/Value -8.06 % -1.77 % -6.29 % -3.82 % -1.62 % -2.20 % -3.74 % 0.08 % -3.81 % Value < Growth
Low/High asy. info. -1.36 % -10.80 % 9.44 % -2.40 % -3.73 % 1.33 % 0.90 % -5.86 % 6.76 % Low asy. < High asy.
Crisis/Growth -8.33 % -2.71 % -5.62 % -6.68 % 2.22 % -8.89 % -16.42 % 1.00 % -17.42 % Growth < Crisis
High/Low prob. -12.37 % -0.27 % -12.10 % -5.54 % -0.88 % -4.66 % n/a n/a n/a Low prob. <*/>** High prob.
More neg. CAAR n/a n/a n/a 4.10 % -5.46 % 9.56 % n/a n/a n/a Less neg. CAAR > More neg. CAAR
Expectation Announcement
Expected SEOs Expected SEOs Unexpected SEOs
 
*   on expectation 
**  on announcement 
In Table 9.6, we have summarized the results from all t-tests conducted. Those not 
previously elaborated, can be reviewed in the appendix chapter 12.4.2. One 
interesting finding was that the relative size of the issue was significant at both event 
dates for dataset 1, and on the announcement date for dataset 2. In addition, we 
found that whether the firm was regarded as value or growth had no significant 
impact on the abnormal return on any event dates. Moreover, expected SEOs 
characterized by a high probability of being completed experienced a significantly 
more negative abnormal return on the expectation date. This is in line with our 
expectations. The same SEOs also experienced a more negative abnormal return 
on announcement. This is however not in line with what we expected if the offerings 
in fact were priced into the market. This might be explained by a possible 
relationship between the probability and the crisis variables. 
9.2 Multiple regression  
In order to examine how different variables vary with the observed abnormal return, 
we have conducted an OLS multiple regression analysis. The analysis was 
implemented for both dataset 1 and 2 (expected- and unexpected SEOs) on the 
announcement date. In order to compare the effects on the expectation- and the 
announcement date, we have for dataset 1 performed the same test on the 
expectation date. The analysis is carried out with respect to abnormal return for the 
event window (-10, 10).  
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The variables included are: 
- lnmcap, which is the firm’s market capitalization on the day prior to the 
expectation- or announcement date 
- rel, is the relative size of the issue obtained by dividing the total amount 
raised through the equity issue by the firm’s market capitalization prior to the 
event date 
- pp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the issue is a private placement, 
and 0 if it is a rights issue 
- PB is the price to book ratio on the day prior to the event date 
- crisis is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the issue is related to a 
crisis, and 0 if it is not 
- industry is the industry that the firm operates within 
- low_asy, is a dummy variable measuring the degree of asymmetrical 
information. If the last report published was less than 50 days prior to the 
expectation date, the dummy variable is equal to 1 
- L, M and H are dummy variables presenting the strength of the indication to 
an near- or medium term SEO 
- last_seo, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm have executed a SEO 
within the last two years 
- expected is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO derives from dataset 1  
-  symbolizes the residual 
9.2.1 Expectation date  
By looking at the correlation matrix displayed in the appendix chapter 12.4.3, we 
observe a high degree of correlation between the variables representing market 
capitalization and the relative size of the issue. Including these variables may result 
in the effects not being attributed to the right variable. This is consistent with the 
weaknesses elaborated in chapter 6.3.4. Therefore, we decided to exclude the 
variable rel from the regression. The following equation was tested with respect to 
the expectation date:  
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The results from the regression are presented in table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 
Coefficient t-value p-value
Constant -0.832 2.040 0.048
Market capitalization 0.041 2.250 0.030
Private placement -0.068 -1.220 0.228
Price to book ratio -0.024 -1.580 0.123
Crisis offering -0.022 -0.480 0.631
Low asymmetric information 0.096 2.100 0.043
Industry -0.023 -1.510 0.140
Low probability 0.056 0.760 0.452
Medium probability 0.015 0.260 0.799
Less than 2 years since last SEO 0.006 0.110 0.909
 
From the table we are able to conclude that the variables representing market 
capitalization and information asymmetry were significant at a 0.05 level. It is no 
surprise that the size of the firm has an impact on the abnormal return. The 
coefficient indicated that firms with larger market capitalization experienced a more 
positive announcement effect compared to smaller capitalized firms. Furthermore, it 
is surprising that the crisis variable did not show a lower p-value, as the equivalent t-
test indicated some difference between SEOs characterized as growth and crisis. 
The same applies to the probability variables. The observed R2, which is the 
explanatory parameter of the model, equals 0.29. This means that more than 70 % 
of the variation in the abnormal return was explained by other variables than those 
included. 
9.2.2 Announcement date  
For the analysis on the announcement date, we have conducted one regression on 
dataset 1 and 2 combined. In addition to the variables explained earlier, we have 
included three interaction variables. These are generated by multiplying the variable 
expected with variables representing market capitalization, price to book ratio and 
crisis issue. We included the three variables, as we found it interesting to examine 
the difference in the level of significance between the two datasets.  
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The equation with respect to the announcement date contains many of the same 
variables as the equation above: 
 
In the combined dataset, we found a high degree of correlation between some of the 
independent variables, see appendix 12.4.3. The variables that showed the highest 
degree of correlation, was the ones representing firm size and the relative size of 
the issue. For the same reasons as mentioned above, we have decided to exclude 
the variable rel from our analysis.  
Table 9.8 
Coefficient t-value p-value
Constant 0.139 0.410 0.746
Market capitalization -0.012 -0.850 0.398
Private placement 0.078 1.120 0.265
Price to book ratio 0.001 0.710 0.478
Crisis offering -0.233 -2.440 0.017
Low asymmetric information 0.022 0.450 0.652
Industry 0.008 0.940 0.343
Expected -1.204 -2.000 0.050
Less than 2 years since the last issue 0.024 0.460 0.648
Interaction(Market cap. * Expected) 0.061 2.120 0.038
Interaction(Crisis * Expected) 0.139 1.210 0.230
Interaction(P/B ratio * Expected) -0.039 -2.690 0.009
 
From table 9.8 we observe that the variable describing crisis issues was significant 
at a 0.05 level. This was as expected, and in line with the results obtained on the 
equivalent t-test. We also found that the interaction variables describing market 
capitalization and the price to book ratio for expected SEOs, were significant. This 
may be interpreted as though the effect of the firms’ market capitalization and price 
to book ratio on the abnormal return is greater for expected- than unexpected SEOs. 
The coefficients indicate that larger capitalized firms experienced a less negative 
announcement effect, and that a higher price to book ratio lead to a more negative 
abnormal return for expected SEOs compared to unexpected SEOs. Looking back 
at our previously conducted t-tests for growth- and value firms, it was surprising that 
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the interaction variable containing the price to book ratio was significant. This may 
indicate that we in the t-tests did not manage to isolate the “real effect” of the 
variable. 
From chapter 7.2 we know that the composition of sectors are very different 
between the two datasets. This could have affected our results. However, we 
observe from the table above that the industry variable was far from significant. This 
implies that the different composition of sectors between our datasets, have close to 
no impact on our results. In addition, the variable for expected SEOs proved to be 
significant. The observed coefficient indicates that expected SEOs experienced a 
more negative announcement effect. This is equivalent to what the results from the 
event study indicated, although the difference was far from significant. It is worth 
mentioning that because dataset 1 was composed by 60 % crisis issues, while the 
equivalent number for dataset 2 was just below 20 %, the variables expected and 
crisis are correlated. This may explain why the variable expected proved to be 
significant in this analysis. Although the variables were correlated, we chose not to 
exclude any of them, as we perceive both essential to our analysis.  
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10. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have analyzed SEOs completed by Norwegian firms in the period 
between January 2011 and August 2015. The focus has been on the short-term 
performance of firms issuing equity. By dividing our selection of firms into two 
groups, one composed by firms were the SEO was expected, and the other of firms 
unexpectedly executing an SEO, we were able to examine the abnormal return for 
both groups on announcement. In addition, for the group consisting of expected 
SEOs we were able to identify the stock price reaction on the expectation date.  
Around the selected expectation date, we found that the group of firms with 
expected SEOs experienced a large negative abnormal return. However, by 
observing the development in the abnormal return in the event window (-20, 20), the 
effect seemed to correct itself. This result made us question if we have managed to 
locate the date where the SEOs was expected by the market. On the other hand, 
our rebased analysis suggested that the same group of firms experienced a lasting 
negative momentum throughout the year prior to the issue. 
We would predict the firms, where the market already expected an SEO, to 
experience a less profound stock price reaction on the announcement date. Our 
predictions were not supported by the results obtained through several analyses. 
The group of firms composed by expected SEOs showed a slightly higher negative 
average abnormal return in all event windows. However, the effect was not 
statistically significant. From the multiple regression analysis, we found that the 
variable for expected SEOs had a significant impact on the announcement effect, 
where expected SEOs experienced a more negative announcement effect. On the 
other hand, this variable was highly correlated with crisis offerings, and the result 
should be interpreted with caution. 
From the cross-sectional analysis, we found for both datasets a difference in 
abnormal return depending on the firm’s size. For the group of firms with expected 
SEOs, larger firms experienced a significant lower negative abnormal return on both 
the expectation- and announcement date. This coincides with our findings for 
unexpected SEOs on announcement. From the multiple regression, we observed 
that large capitalized firms with expected SEOs experienced a significantly lower 
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average abnormal return on announcement compared to firms where the SEO was 
unexpected. In addition, firms with large price to book ratios (growth firms) from the 
same group experienced a significantly greater negative abnormal return relative to 
the firms conducting unexpected SEOs.  
Another interesting variable from the cross-sectional analyses was whether growth 
or crisis characterized the SEO. Firms with expected crisis issues experienced a 
larger negative abnormal return on both the expectation- and announcement date. 
This result corresponded with the announcement effect for unexpected SEOs. 
Although the graphs showed an unambiguous trend, the difference was not 
significant at a 0.05 level. In our multiple regression model, the same variable 
proved to be highly significant. Based on these results, we infer that the abnormal 
return is affected by whether the issue is connected to a crisis or growth 
opportunities. At last, we found that firms experiencing a large negative abnormal 
return on the expectation date also experienced a more negative announcement 
effect. Although the effect was not significant, it strengthens our belief that we may 
not have identified the right expectation date or that our dataset contains firms with 
negative momentum. 
As our results were somewhat surprising, it is relevant to mention the factors that 
may have affected our results the most. Of the expected SEOs, 60 % were regarded 
as crisis issues, whereas the equivalent number for unexpected SEOs was only 20 
%. The results may be caused by the bias of crisis issues, which most likely also 
were amplified by the small sample size. Furthermore, looking at the key words 
applied to identify most of the expected SEOs, they are clearly composed of a 
majority of words indicating liquidity problems. Consequently, we may have 
identified firms experiencing negative momentum, which would have an impact on 
our results.  
Although our sample size was small, we obtained interesting results. However, in 
order to draw conclusions on behalf of the entire population, we recommend doing 
the study on a larger sample with a more even distribution of crisis offerings 
between expected- and unexpected SEOs. We find the topic highly relevant for 
investors, and our results should at least provide some insights into the issue of 
expected SEOs.  
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12. Appendix 
12.1 Theory  
12.1.1 Interaction (market timing and pecking order) 
Dong et. al. (2012) conducted an interesting study about the interaction between the 
market-timing hypothesis and the pecking order theory in the financing decision of 
firms. In the study, they found evidence indicating that firms are more likely to issue 
equity when their shares are overvalued and repurchase when undervalued. 
However, this was only the case when firms were not financially constrained. In 
addition, post-announcement long-run returns were lower for overvalued firms. 
These findings are closer related to the market-timing hypothesis than rational 
financing theories such as the pecking order theory. The study also showed findings 
consistent with the pecking order theory. Their findings supports the theoretical 
foundation stating that firms prefer debt to equity financing. This was, as above, only 
true when the firm was not under financial pressure. The results was only significant 
for firms that were not overvalued.  
12.2 Methodology  
12.2.1 Modeling the normal return  
Several approaches could be applied while estimating the normal return for a given 
stock. These can again be separated into two superior categories: statistical and 
economic. The economic models are reliant on assumptions regarding investor’s 
behavior, and are not solely based on statistical assumptions. This means that 
economic models are restricted statistically, which could in fact give a more precise 
measure of the normal return. The downside however, is that results estimated 
using economic models are said to be very sensitive to these statistical restrictions. 
Based on this we will focus on statistical models, which are based only on statistical 
assumptions and thus avoiding the sensitivity that can occur using economic 
models. The most common statistical models are the mean return model and the 
market model, for these the distribution assumption is sufficient. Statistical models 
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assume that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal and independently and 
identically distributed through time. Even though this is a strong assumption to 
make, empirically it does not seem to create any difficulties.  
According to Brown and Warner (1985), the market model provides the best results, 
and MacKinlay states that the market model represents a potential improvement 
over the constant mean return model. The improvement involves that the variance 
of the abnormal return is reduced. This makes it easier to detect any abnormal 
return, and in turn the event effects. Due to this, we have decided to apply the 
market model to estimate normal returns and thus abnormal returns.  
The market model relates the return of any given stock to the return of the market 
portfolio, and based on the assumed joint normality it is a linear specification. For 
any security, i, the market model can be expressed as followed:   
 
          
where Rit is the return for security i, which is measured based on the estimation 
window defined in chapter 6.1.4. Rmt are the returns in the same estimation window, 
but for the market portfolio. The expression it are representing the zero mean 
disturbance, and the parameters representing the market model are respectively I, 
i and 2i. Furthermore, as MacKinlay (1997) and Bartholdy et al. (2007) 
recommended using a broad stock index to measure the return of the market 
portfolio.  
To estimate the parameters of the market model, which are mentioned above, it is 
suitable to use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This method assumes 
no autocorrelation and a constant variance over time. The method accumulates the 
following estimators on the market model parameters for firm i in the event window: 
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where 
  
     and         
Rit and Rmt are the return in event period t for stock i and the market respectively.  
12.2.2 Abnormal return  
Based on the obtained estimates of the market model we are able to calculate the 
abnormal returns. The abnormal return is attained by measuring the difference 
between the actual return and the normal return based on the estimation window.  
The formula for abnormal return is given by:  
 
where the abnormal return is equal to the difference between the observed return 
for security i at time t (Riτ), and the parameters of the market model in addition to the 
return on the market portfolio at time t ( ).  
Due to the null hypothesis, which is conditional on the event window market return, 
the abnormal return will be normally distributed with an expected value equal to zero 
and variance equal to:  
 
By looking at the equation above, we see that the conditional variance consists of 
two components. The first term of the equation, σ2εi, is the disturbance variance. 
Whereas the second term is the additional variance, which is a result of the 
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sampling error in αi and βi. This sampling error can be diminishing and the second 
term can approach zero if the length of the estimation window L1 becomes large. If 
the estimation window is large enough the variance of the abnormal return will be 
equal to σ2εi and the observations of the abnormal return will be independent 
through time. Under the null hypothesis, H0, the abnormal return can be used to 
draw presumptions over any period within the event window. This can be expressed 
as:  
 
However, before any overall conclusions regarding the event can be drawn, the 
abnormal return observations must be aggregated across both time and securities.  
This two dimensional process consists of firstly aggregating abnormal return through 
time for each individual security, and then secondly aggregating the abnormal return 
both through securities and time. This process is a necessity to be able to measure 
the cumulative abnormal return in a multiple period event window. For security, I, 
the cumulative abnormal return is specified as: 
 
where ԏ1 to ԏ2 is the event window, further characterized by T1 < ԏ1 ≤ ԏ2 ≤ T2. 
Furthermore, if L1 is large enough, the variance of  is represented as:  
 
Under H0, the distribution of the cumulative abnormal return are expressed by:  
 
Since one event observation will not give any significant conclusion on how the 
market has responded in the past, it is necessary to aggregate the abnormal return 
observations for the event window and through observations of the event.  This will 
more likely give inferences of what has happened in the past and what we can 
expect to happen when an SEO are expected in the future. It is important to note 
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that in this aggregation it is assumed no overlaps, also called clustering, in the event 
window of the selected securities. With no clustering the abnormal and cumulative 
returns across securities will have no correlation, and returns would be independent 
across stocks. The average aggregated abnormal returns for period , given the 
number of events, N, is given by:   
 
with a variance of  
 
given a large L1. 
This gives the ability to analyze any abnormal return for any event period. However, 
we are taking it a step further by aggregating the abnormal return over the event 
window, which will present the cumulative average abnormal return. By estimating 
the cumulative average abnormal return, we are eventually able to test our null 
hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero when an SEO are presumed 
expected.  The cumulative average abnormal return for any interval in the event 
window using the approach to aggregate is:  
 
 
A second approach to retrieve the cumulative average abnormal return is to form 
the CAR’s security by security and aggregate these through time: 
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The covariance component is set to zero due to the assumption of no clustering. 
Eventually, to taking conclusions concerning the cumulative average abnormal 
return and test the hypothesis, the below expression can be used:  
 
At last, it is necessary to mention that in practice an estimator must be used to 
calculate the variance of the abnormal returns. This is due to the fact that σ2εi is 
unknown. The appropriate choice of σ2εi according to MacKinlay (1997) is the 
sample variance measure of σ2εi from the market model regression in the estimation 
window. By doing this the distributional result will be asymptotic with respect to N 
and L1. Thus, if the choice falls upon using this to calculate the average aggregated 
abnormal return, , the following expression can test the hypothesis:  
 
12.2.3 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
The test is a nonparametric test where the null hypothesis is that two samples are 
from the same population. The test ranks the observations, and sums the rank for 
each sample. The observed rank sum for the smallest sample, W, is then tested 
against an expected rank sum, μ, which is based on the number of observations. 
For large samples, the test-statistic is approximately normally distributed. (Keller, 
2009). The test statistic,  
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with 
 
can then be tested with a z-test: 
 
12.2.4 Independent two-sample t-test  
In order to examine whether the average performance between two groups are 
significantly different or if it is due to chance, it is possible to apply a two-sample t-
test. In the two-sample t-test, the observations are divided into groups based on 
different characteristics. This makes it possible to measure the group’s performance 
against each other, and make inferences about whether the groups’ different 
characteristics resulted in a significant difference. Note, the procedure is based on 
the t-distribution, and for small samples, it is more sufficient if the data are drawn 
from distributions that are normal or close. The independent t-value can be 
calculated as following: 
 
where  
 
is defined as the pooled standard deviation, which is a method for estimating the 
standard deviation for several different groups while the performance of each group 
may be different. 1 and 2 are respectively representing group one and group two, n 
are equal to the number of observation, and at last,  are the average performance. 
(Keller, 2009) 
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12.2.5 Multiple regression  
In order to examine the relationship between independent variables and one 
dependent variable, it is possible to employ a cross-sectional regression. In order to 
test if other characteristics than those specific to the event have an impact on the 
dependent variable, a cross-sectional regression can be used.  
The regression model are expressed by:  
 
 
where ARj is the j number value of the dependent variable observation, Xmj,m = 1,.., 
M, are M characteristics for the j number of observations and (nj) is the zero mean 
disturbance term that is uncorrelated with the x’s.  δm,m = 0,…,M are the regression 
coefficients. The regression model can be estimated by adopting the ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS).  
The OLS regression estimates the dependent variable through a linear model. The 
aim of the model is to minimize the difference between the observations and the 
linear predication conducted by the model. By doing this the test returns a 
descriptive statistic, R2, explaining the predictive power of the model. In addition, 
each characteristic will receive a p-value indicating whether the independent 
variable has significant impact on the dependent variable. (MacKinley, 1997) 
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12.3 Datasets 
Table 12.1 
Company Announced Company Announced
Archer 31.01.2013 AF Gruppen 08.07.2011
Asetek 24.02.2015 Algeta 13.02.2012
Bridge Energy 19.01.2012 Archer 23.08.2011
Deep Sea Supply 02.06.2014 BWG Homes 14.02.2012
Det Norske Oljeselskap 30.08.2011 Copeinca 05.04.2013
Det Norske Oljeselskap 04.12.2012 Dockwise 30.04.2012
Det Norske Oljeselskap 02.06.2014 Doplhin Group 13.02.2013
DNO 09.03.2015 EMAS Offshore 10.07.2014
DOF 12.09.2011 Nio Inc. 30.04.2012
Dolphin Group 21.04.2015 Gaming Innovation Group 16.02.2015
Eitzen Chemical 15.04.2011 Idex 26.03.2015
Frontline 06.06.2013 Idex 03.01.2014
Havila Shipping 27.06.2011 NEL 03.06.2015
Havila Shipping 10.12.2012 NEL 08.09.2014
Höegh LNG Holdings 09.09.2015 Norsk Hydro 03.05.2010
Interoil Exploration and Production 11.02.2013 Norwegian Car Carriers 10.02.2011
Marine Harvest 17.12.2012 Norwegian Car Carriers 13.02.2012
Sparebank 1 SMN 01.02.2012 North Energy 21.01.2014
Sparebanken Møre 13.06.2013 Norwegian Property 05.11.2012
Northland Resources 02.02.2012 Opera Software 07.11.2013
Norse Energy Corp. 24.03.2011 Opera Software 26.06.2014
Norse Energy Corp. 26.01.2012 Reach Subsea 03.05.2013
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge 13.08.2013 Siem Offshore 11.06.2015
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge 01.03.2011 Spectrum 01.06.2015
Norwegian Energy Company 28.09.2012 Thin Film Electronics 18.06.2015
Norwegian Energy Company 21.10.2013 Thin Film Electronics 02.10.2013
North Energy 09.02.2012 Thin Film Electronics 30.10.2013
Polarcus 06.10.2014 Vardia Insurance 02.03.2015
Polarcus 11.10.2011 Clavis Pharma 17.01.2012
Polarcus 13.03.2012 Weifa 09.09.2014
Prospector Offshore Drilling 17.09.2012 Weifa 17.06.2014
Prosafe 14.03.2013
Questerre Energy Corporation 20.11.2013
Q-Free 02.11.2011
Renewable Energy Corporation 22.06.2012
Renewble Energy Cooperation 14.05.2013
REC Silicon 15.07.2015
Rocksource 01.02.2011
Rocksource 12.01.2015
Salmar 29.02.2012
Scana Industrier 04.05.2015
Scana Industrier 15.12.2011
Sevan Drilling 14.01.2013
SinOceanic Shipping 15.05.2013
Sparebank 1 Østfold Akershus 21.05.2015
Songa Offshore 25.11.2013
Songa Offshore 19.04.2012
Spectrum 29.07.2011
Sparebank 1 SR-Bank 17.04.2012
Wentworth Resources 28.10.2013
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
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12.4 Analysis  
12.4.1 CAAR excluding observations 
The results obtained from the analysis completed on dataset 1 and 2 excluding 
observations above and below +/- 30 %, are presented in the following. The 
exclusion was based on the event window (-10, 10) on announcement. 
Expected SEOs on the expectation date  
Table 12.2 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-0.25 % -5.55 % -2.25 % -1.13 % -0.04 % -0.61 % -1.68 %
Median -0.18 % -1.01 % -1.36 % 0.06 % 0.05 % -1.63 % -1.97 %
t-value -0.060 -2.040 -1.170 -0.700 -0.300 -0.400 -0.940
p-value 0.953 0.048 0.247 0.486 0.765 0.689 0.35
Std. Dev. 0.042 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.018
Skewness -0.550 -0.593 -0.585 -0.923 -1.239 0.152 -0.538
Excess kurtosis 3.209 0.444 1.531 2.964 2.843 0.351 1.110
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
 
Expected SEOs on the announcement date  
Table 12.3 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-4.41 % -2.87 % -3.73 % -3.78 % -6.27 % -3.78 % -3.89 %
Median -5.92 % -0.04 % -2.88 % -2.49 % -4.15 % -6.23 % -3.90 %
t-value -1.400 -1.500 -1.850 -1.830 -2.650 -1.890 -2.080
p-value 0.171 0.142 0.072 0.075 0.011 0.066 0.044
Std. Dev. 0.032 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.020 0.019
Skewness 0.552 -0.027 -0.417 -1.680 -2.731 -0.202 -0.275
Excess kurtosis 0.824 -0.232 1.444 6.882 11.333 1.603 0.956
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
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Unexpected SEO on the announcement date  
Table 12.4 
Event window (-20, 20) (-10, 10) (-5, 5) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 5) (-1, 10)
-0.83 % -3.47 % 0.61 % 2.30 % 1.68 % -0.49 % -2.16 %
Median -1.12 % -3.94 % 0.23 % -1.12 % -0.22 % -2.60 % -3.53 %
t-value -0.24 -1.960 0.370 1.330 1.180 -0.380 -1.39
p-value 0.809 0.062 0.712 0.198 0.249 0.707 0.178
Std. Dev. 0.034 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.016
Skewness -0.137 -0.470 0.398 0.650 0.682 0.498 -0.032
Excess kurtosis 1.471 -0.106 0.380 -0.437 0.104 0.740 1.087
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
 
12.4.2 Rebased analysis 
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Figure 12.1     Figure 12.2 
12.4.3 Independent two-sample t-tests 
Value or growth company 
Based on the price to book ratio (P/B), we are going to test whether or not the value 
of the firm has a significant influence on the stock price reaction. If a firm has a (P/B) 
of 1, we may say that the expected growth is equal to investor’s required return. 
Firms with a low P/B are often viewed as mature firms with stable growth and cash 
flows. Hence, higher P/B can be justified by higher growth prospects. Defining firms 
as growth or value based on the P/B ratio is consistent with previous studies 
conducted by Capaul et. al. (1993) and D`Mello et. al. (2003). Our hypothesis is that 
firms with relatively high P/B (growth) will experience a smaller stock price reaction. 
This is consistent with the Wasteful Investment Hypothesis explained in 5.2.1. It is 
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also worth mentioning that firms currently in some sort of crisis may have artificially 
low P/B. One explanation for this is that their stock price has dropped significantly, 
yet the firm has not taken sufficient write down on their books. A good example of 
this is the current situation (2015) in the offshore sector. The following represents 
our hypotheses:  
 
 
Where μ(0) and μ(1) are expressions for respectively firms with high P/B (growth) 
and low P/B (value).  
Expected SEOs on the expectation date  
By conducting the two-sample t-test on expected SEOs with respect to the 
expectation date we obtained the following results:  
Table 12.5 
Growth (0) Value (1) 0-1
-8.06 % -1.77 % -6.29 %
Median -4.36 % -1.95 % -2.41 %
t-value -1.195
p-value 0.120
N 20 20 40
 
To our surprise, we found the opposite of what we predicted. From the table, we 
observe that growth firms had a higher CAAR in comparison with value firms. 
However, with a p-value of 0.120, the difference in CAAR of -6.29 % was not 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level, and we are not able to reject our null 
hypothesis. Referring to the figure, we see that the development in CAAR is equal 
prior to day 0, and quite different after. 
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Figure 12.3 
Expected- and unexpected SEOs on the announcement date  
By applying the same test as above on the announcement date for both expected- 
and unexpected SEOs, we obtained the results presented in table 12.6.  
Table 12.6     
Growth (0) Value (1) 0-1 Growth (0) Value (1) 0-1
-3.82 % -1.62 % -2.20 % -3.74 % 0.08 % -3.81 %
Median -5.26 % -9.31 % 4.05 % -5.26 % -0.48 % -4.79 %
t-value -0.311 -0.489
p-value 0.379 0.316
N 20 20 40 14 14 28
Expected Unexpected
 
Looking at expected SEOs, we found that the difference in CAAR of -2.20 % was 
not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.379. The same result applied for 
unexpected SEOs, with a difference in CAAR of -3.81 % and a p-value of 0.316. 
Based on expected SEOs on the announcement date we observe less difference 
between growth- and value firms in comparison to expected SEOs on the 
expectation date. Figure 12.4 and 12.5 visualizes the CAAR for growth- and value 
firms when SEOs are expected and unexpected during the event window (-10, 10). 
The graph containing the development for unexpected SEOs displays a more 
different development in the abnormal return between growth and value firms. This 
may be caused by the different composition of the two datasets. 
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Figure 12.4 – Expected     Figure 12.5 – Unexpected  
Probability of execution   
Depending on which and how rapidly the key words used to define SEOs as 
expected occur, we have given each of the expected SEOs a probability of being 
executed. Each of the observed SEOs are either given the value 0 or 1, respectively 
representing high- and low probability. We predict that firms characterized by high 
probability of completing the SEO would experience a larger negative stock price 
reaction on the expectation date compared to SEOs characterized by low 
probability. For the announcement date, we predict the opposite.  
Expected SEOs on the expectation date  
We have the following hypothesis for expected SEOs on the expectation date:  
 
 
By grouping the firms with respect to high- and low probability, we located 24 firms 
belonging to the group of high probability and 26 to the group of low probability. The 
table shows the obtained results:  
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Table 12.7 
High prob. (0) Low prob. (1) 0-1
-12.37 % -0.27 % -12.10 %
Median -8.01 % -0.20 % -7.82 %
t-value -2.775
p-value 0.004
N 24 26 50
 
As indicated from the results we observe indications on a less profound negative 
market reaction for firms having a lower probability of implementing the SEO. We 
found high- and low probability firms to have a CAAR equal to -12.37 % and -0.27 
%, constituting a significant difference in CAAR of -12.10 %. The development in 
CAAR is illustrated in the figure below. The difference is as expected large, and 
seems to gradually evolve throughout the event window. 
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Figure 12.6 
Expected SEOs on the announcement date  
In accordance with our prediction that SEOs with high probability of being executed 
will experience a more profound negative stock price reaction around the 
expectation date, we found it reasonable to believe that the same SEOs will have a 
less negative announcement effect. Consequently, our hypotheses are as followed:  
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The descriptive statistics obtained:  
Table 12.8 
High prob. (0) Low prob. (1) 0-1
-5.54 % -0.88 % -4.66 %
Median -4.30 % -5.26 % 0.97 %
t-value -0.727
p-value 0.236
N 24 26 50
  
From the descriptive statistics, we found a similar tendency as for the expectation 
date. However, we observe a smaller difference in CAAR on the announcement 
date, where high- and low probability have CAARs of respectively -5.54 % and -0.88 
%, constituting a difference in CAAR of -4.66 %. The results is opposite of what we 
expected to find, as we predicted the high probability issues to be object to less 
value destruction than those with low probability. This may be due to some other 
factors driving the observed abnormal return for the two groups, or that our 
probability predictions are uncertain. By looking at the obtained p-value, we found 
the difference in CAAR not to be statistically significant at a 0.05 level, and we are 
not able to reject our null hypothesis.  
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Figure 12.7 
Presenting a visual overview of the development in CAAR for the event window (-
10, 10) we observed the largest difference between the two groups on day 0. From 
day 1, the development in CAAR is quite different. This indicates that there is a 
difference in abnormal return, although it is not significant.  
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The size of the issue relative to market capitalization  
In the following, we examine whether the size of the SEO relative to the firm’s 
market capitalization constitutes a significant difference on the stock price reaction. 
We obtain the relative size by dividing the capital raised on the firm’s market 
capitalization on the date prior to the expectation and announcement date. As a 
relative large issue will be more dilutive for the firm’s investors, it is reasonable to 
assume that the negative stock price reaction will be larger for those issuing a SEO 
whose size is large relative to their current market capitalization. This is equivalent 
with the wasteful investment hypothesis (Barklay & Litzenberg, 1988) and research 
done by Asquith and Mullins (1986, 1). Mikkelson and Parch (1986), did however 
not find any relationship between the size of the issue and the firm’s value 
destruction. Although these are studies of the absolute size of the issue, we find 
their results relevant. The hypotheses tested are:  
 
 
Where μ(0) and μ(1) represent respectively firms with a relatively larger and smaller 
SEO.  
Expected SEOs on the expectation date  
Although the size of the issue is not publicly known prior to announcement, we 
believe that the approximate size of an expected SEO are assimilated by the 
market. The results obtained with respect to dataset 1 (expected SEOs) on the 
expectation date are presented in table 12.9.  
Table 12.9 
Big size (0) Small size (1) 0-1
-10.85 % -0.32 % -10.54 %
Median -6.81 % -0.49 % -6.32 %
t-value -2.238
p-value 0.016
N 20 20 40
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With a p-value of 0.016, we found that the relative size of the issue had a 
significantly impact on the firm’s stock price. This indicates, as predicted, that the 
size of the issue is expected and factored in by the market. This is confirmed by the 
figure showing a gradually more negative abnormal return for relatively large 
expected SEOs. 
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Figure 12.8 
Expected- and unexpected SEOs on the announcement date  
The results concerning the impact of the relative size on announcement date for 
both expected and unexpected SEOs are presented in table 12.10.  
Table 12.10     
Big size (0) Small size (1) 0-1 Big size (0) Small size (1) 0-1
-7.71 % 6.23 % -13.94 % -10.71 % 1.58 % -12.29 %
Median -4.16 % 1.61 % -5.77 % -3.96 % -1.56 % -2.40 %
t-value -1.981 -1.685
p-value 0.027 0.052
N 20 20 40 14 14 28
Expected Unexpected
 
Also on the announcement date, the difference between large and small expected 
SEOs had a significant impact on the abnormal return. The effect was equivalent for 
unexpected SEOs, however the effect was not significant. In addition, larger 
unexpected SEOs experienced a more negative abnormal return in comparison with 
large expected SEOs. From the figures we observe a similar trend within both 
datasets, but the trend are developing more differently for unexpected SEOs. 
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Figure 12.9 – Expected    Figure 12.10 – Unexpected  
Information asymmetry  
Referring back to the theory related to asymmetrical information in chapter 4.2, we 
know from the market-timing hypothesis that firms will prefer to issue equity when 
their stocks are overvalued. However, due to the existence of asymmetrical 
information, investors may interpret the issue as a signal of the firm being 
overvalued and therefore value the new equity accordingly. This is one of the 
reasons for why Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) suggest that it is optimal to conduct 
a SEO in periods with low asymmetrical information. This would enable firms to 
signal their true value, and thus diminishing the negative stock price reaction. Based 
on this we assume that higher asymmetry, will lead to larger abnormal return.  
As a measure of asymmetry, we are applying the time since the last quarterly- or 
annual report. Firms that presented their last report less than 50 days prior to the 
event dates are characterized by having a low degree of asymmetry. Whereas firms 
presenting their last report more than 50 days prior to the event dates are 
characterized by high information asymmetry. Our hypoteses are given by:  
 
 
Where μ(0) and μ(1) represent respectively firms with low and high asymmetry.  
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Expected SEOs on the expectation date  
The results for expected SEOs on the expectation date are presented in table 12.11.  
Table 12.11 
Low asy. (0) High asy. (1) 0-1
-1.36 % -10.80 % 9.44 %
Median -0.74 % -8.95 % 8.21 %
t-value 2.117
p-value 0.020
N 25 25 41
 
The descriptive statistics suggests that firms with high asymmetry experiences a 
significantly higher negative abnormal return in the event window (-10, 10). This is 
as expected, and the development in CAAR stipulated below confirms this result.  
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Figure 12.11 
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Expected and unexpected SEOs on Announcement date  
The descriptive statistics for both datasets on the announcement date are shown in 
table 12.12.  
Table 12.12     
Low asy. (0) High asy. (1) 0-1 Low asy. (0) High asy. (1) 0-1
-4.56 % -8.77 % 4.22 % 0.90 % -5.86 % 6.76 %
Median -3.31 % -6.56 % 3.25 % -5.14 % 1.20 % -6.34 %
t-value 0.989 0.902
p-value 0.164 0.187
N 23 27 50 16 15 31
Expected Unexpected
 
From the results, we observed that firms from both datasets with a higher degree of 
information asymmetry experienced a smaller price reduction on the announcement 
date. However, the difference was larger for the firms consisting of unexpected 
SEOs. Looking at the p-values, the differences were not found statistically 
significant at a 0.05 level. Figure 12.12 and 12.13 gives a visual overview of the 
development in CAAR for both expected and unexpected SEOs in the event window 
(-10, 10). The two different groups, high- and low asymmetry, of expected SEOs 
experienced a more similar development in CAAR, than equivalent unexpected 
SEOs. 
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Figure 12.12 – Expected    Figure 12.13 – Unexpected  
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12.4.4 Correlation matrixes  
Table 12.13 – The expectation date 
lnmcap rel pp sector crisis PB low_asy. last_SEO H M L
lnmcap 1
rel -0.5439 1
pp -0.0728 0.0376 1
sector -0.0621 0.0819 -0.5399 1
crisis -0.0194 -0.1815 0.2004 -0.1955 1
PB 0.0624 -0.1839 -0.0510 -0.1681 0.0302 1
low_asy. -0.0286 0.0731 -0.1091 0.1895 -0.3266 -0.0463 1
last_SEO -0.2661 0.2250 -0.0528 -0.1294 0.1480 -0.0866 -0.0806 1
H -0.3119 0.2502 0.1667 -0.0501 0.1782 0.0383 -0.1309 0.2110 1
M -0.0123 -0.0293 -0.1273 -0.2153 0.0170 0.1239 0.0000 0.2585 -0.4910 1
L 0.3142 -0.2124 -0.0322 0.2666 -0.1896 -0.1609 0.1267 -0.4661 -0.4699 -0.5383 1
 
Table 12.14 – The announcement date 
lnmcap rel pp sector crisis PB low_asy. expected last _SEO
lnmcap 1
rel -0.6286 1
pp 0.0010 -0.0869 1
sector -0.0005 0.0009 -0.1941 1
crisis -0.1603 0.0001 -0.0081 -0.0683 1
PB 0.0857 -0.1471 0.0812 -0.0967 -0.1827 1
low_asy. 0.1217 0.0183 -0.1229 0.1333 -0.2155 3.7E-05 1
expected -0.0273 0.0218 -0.0897 -0.2071 0.3976 -2.7E-01 -0.0546 1
last_SEO -0.0876 0.0814 0.0935 -0.0958 -0.0166 1.6E-01 -0.0385 -0.1054 1
 
 
